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PART I 
IDENTIFICATION OF TRENDS 
Changes in economic context 
The non-petroleum-producing countries of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had not 
recovered from the shock of oil price increases during 1973-74 when their 
economies were hit by the second wave of increases (1979) and the recession in 
the Western industrial countries. Already accumulating sizeable foreign 
debts, African governments faced in the early 1980s weak primary product 
prices, high real interest rates, and hardening terms for new loans to cover 
balance-of-payments deficits. The decline in the demand for primary products 
reduced growth rates and generated falls in formal sector employment and 
incomes. Since a large portion of government revenues in countries of SSA 
derives from levies on trade, the economic crisis has also been associated 
with large fiscal deficits. Pressures to reduce state expenditure, affecting 
the supply of basic services, and coming in some cases from multilateral 
lenders, has resulted in suspension of development programmes in many 
countries. 
Pcesent economic conditions in SSA are in sharp contrast to the 
favourable and optimistic trends of the 1960s and, to a lesser extent, the 
1970s. Many of the economic and social relationships assumed to be 
fundamental characteristics of SSA countries derive from this period of 
growth. As shall be shown, some of these relationships have proved 
transitory, though they still reside in the predilections and implicit 
analytical prejudices of most observers. In order to place the trends which 
are identified subsequently in context, it is necessary briefly to 
characterise the post-independence period. While each country had its own 
specific characteristics, certain common elements can be isolated. 
In only a few countries of SSA was the struggle for independence from 
colonial masters a particularly violent one. However, in most there was some 
form of political pressure exerted through a national coalition of various 
groups differentiated by region, ethnicity or class. As a consequence, 
political differences, particularly along economic and social lines, were 
obscured by the dichotomy between Europeans (including settlers in some 
countries such as Kenya and Zimbabwe) and Africans, with Asians assuming an 
intermediate position in a number of countries. Corresponding to this, 
divisions in wealth presented themselves as divisions between the privileged 
Europeans and the impoverished African population. With independence, there 
followed in every country a process of "Africanisation", the replacing of 
Europeans and Asians with nationals in the civil service, the universities and 
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the private sector. In some countries, such as Ghana and the United Republic 
of Tanzania, colonial salary scales were compressed, but everywhere the 
difference between what a common labourer earned and the salaries of 
professionals and managers remained enormous. Further, in the absence of a 
landed elite in most of Africa, those earning high incomes comparable to 
salaries in the former colonial centres were concentrated in the major 
cities. Thus, the great income differences passed down as a colonial legacy 
changed from an African/European dichotomy to an urban/rural one. 
Central to this were the wage earners, concentrated in urban areas in 
most SSA countries. Characteristically, trade unions had played a prominent 
role in pressuring for independence. Once independence was granted, workers' 
organisations represented an equally vocal interest group pressuring for 
higher wages, though their importance has in some instances been 
exaggerated. With their prestige high and influence at its peak, trade 
unions were able to achieve wage increases of significance in the immediate 
. . . 3 
post-independence period, particularly in former British East Africa. The 
momentary influence of trade unions increased the appearance that the 
fundamental division in privilege and wealth was between town and countryside. 
The urban-rural division also seemed to be reflected in the development 
orientation of the post-colonial governments. With rare exceptions, the 
colonial masters had not encouraged industry in their possessions. As both an 
economic strategy and as a nationalist desire to redress this arrested 
development, the new governments embarked upon programmes of import 
substitution and large-scale public works such as dams, roads, etc. By their 
nature, these tended either to be located in urban areas or to have their 
benefits concentrated there. The particular way in which these development 
programmes were financed contributed to the interpretation that the 
urban-rural division was the primary one for considering questions of wealth 
Kenya and Zimbabwe, as well as the former Portuguese colonies, were 
exceptions, with White settlers. In Northern Nigeria there was a national 
class based on control of landed property, the Hausa-Fulani elite. Nigeria is 
unusual in this regard. 
2 Particularly in Nigeria. See John Weeks: "The impact of 
institutional factors and economic forces on urban wages in Nigeria", in 
Nigerian Journal of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (1971). An 
example of the over-emphasis on trade union influence is found in Peter 
Kilby: "Industrial relations and wage determination failure of the 
Anglo-Saxon model", in Journal of Developing Areas, I (July 1967). 
John Weeks: "Wage policy and the colonial legacy: A comparative 
study", in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1971). 
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and income distribution. Most governments derived a substantial part of their 
revenues from taxation of agriculture, frequently through state marketing 
boards which set producer prices below world prices. In consequence, it 
seemed the case that urban industry was financed at the cost of an 
undifferentiated rural population. Since the State dominated the formal 
employment sector in most countries (and acted as a wage-leader for private 
industry, many argued), it could plausibly be inferred that peasants were also 
paying for the perceived privileges of the urban working class. 
This characterisation of SSA in the late 1960s we shall call the 
"post-colonial pattern of development". It created in the minds of most 
academic observers and policy makers, national and foreign, a certain stylised 
picture of the typical African country. In this picture, the country was 
divided starkly between a privileged modern sector (later "formal" sector), 
where urban elites and wage earners enjoyed extravagant privileges from high 
incomes and government services, and a vast undifferentiated peasantry that 
lived in poverty and largely produced the wealth to pay for these privileges. 
Between the two was a growing population of urban squatters living in 
increasingly miserable conditions around cities, drawn by the magnet of 
"bright lights" and high wages. 
Once this stylisation of the SSA countries became accepted as 
conventional wisdom, the Todaro model of rural-urban migration was indeed an 
idea whose time had come, epitomising and encapsulating the superficial 
impressions of a generation of development practitioners. In its 
analytical simplicity, explaining the complex and massive problem of urban 
migration in terms of two variables (the rate of urban unemployment and the 
urban-rural income gap), it captured the attention of academics and 
policy-makers in less developed countries much in the way the equally simple 
Phillips Curve did in advanced market economies. 
Here was a tool to explain the stylised imbalances in African societies, 
and it mattered little that all three of the variables in the model were 
theoretically suspect. A wealth of literature argued that unemployment was 
not a valid analytical category in the context of African countries. The 
"urban-rural income differential" rarely was specififed with regard to 
economic differentiation among the peasantry, the key to making it relevant 
for migration. And rural-urban migration had been shown by many studies to be 
considerably more complicated than a question of new arrivals entering a 
Michael Todaro: "A model of urban unemployment and migration for 
less developed countries", in American Economic Review, 59, 1 (Mar. 1969). 
6874d/v.5 
- 4 -
random queue for jobs. When empirical work was done to test the hypothesis, 
the key explanatory variable, the rural-urban income differential, yielded 
mixed results statistically. This, along with trends we identify in the 
next section, suggest that for at least two decades analysts have incorrectly 
modelled the dynamics of labour markets in SSA. We return to this theme in 
the final part of this report. 
In the next section we identify recent trends in SSA. These show that 
the stylised view of African countries derived from the post-colonial pattern 
of development is no longer appropriate. The grand conceptual division 
between town and country upon which this view was based is no longer justified 
in most countries. First, we shall identify the trends with only occasional 
reference to specific countries, then follow this with a country-by-country 
treatment in which the trends previously identified are verified in the 
concrete. In Part III, the country evidence is briefly summarised. 
Labour market trends 
Economic crisis has profoundly changed the character of most African 
economies, bringing about a radical shift in the relationship between rural 
and urban areas, though the poor in both areas have suffered greatly. In what 
follows, we identify eight trends, all closely related and interactive. The 
overall effect of these trends is to require a sharply revised view of African 
economies. 
The first clear trend is that real wages of urban workers have fallen 
during the last ten years, in some cases dramatically. Where evidence is 
available, it appears that unskilled wage earners in the formal sector have 
done worse than the average for all wage workers, and government unskilled 
minimum wages have generally fallen even more. The last trend explains why 
unskilled workers have fared worse than average, as with urban labour markets 
in excess supply, the minimum wage has increasingly become the representative 
wage for many workers. In some cases the fall in real wages has been so 
catastrophic that a growing proportion of wage earner households have been 
pushed below poverty level as measured by ability to purchase a minimum diet. 
If one aspect of privilege is not being in poverty, then fewer and fewer 
See J.B. Knight: "Rural-urban income comparisons and migration in 
Ghana", in Bulletin (Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics), Vol. 34, 
No. 2 (1972); and J.F.S. Levi: "Migration from the land and urban 
unemployment in Sierra Leone", op. cit., Vol. 35, No. 4 (1973). In neither 
study is the measure of rural and urban incomes found to influence the level 
of urban unemployment to any significant degree. 
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African workers are now privileged. The characterisation of the mass of urban 
workers in the region as an "aristocracy of labour" no longer holds true. 
Second, the security and stability of formal sector employment has 
declined. An aspect of the stylised characterisation of African societies in 
the post-colonial pattern of development was to stress the stability of 
employment and the inability of employers, public and private, to discharge 
workers. In hindsight, this characterisation (labour being virtually a "fixed 
cost") was a phenomenon of prosperity and expanding employment opportunities. 
In most countries of the region private sector employment has declined, and 
falls in government employment have not been unusual. If obtaining a formal 
sector job in the past involved the expectation of holding that job 
indefinitely, this is no longer true. In some African countries entire 
industries have shut down (iron-ore mining in Sierra Leone) and in most they 
are running up well below capacity levels. If protective legislation once 
made it difficult for private employers to discharge workers, such regulations 
are now commonly ignored, or ways have been found to circumvent them. As a 
consequence, even the employed face increasing job insecurity. Limited 
evidence indicates that employment has declined more for unskilled workers 
than for the semi-skilled and skilled. 
As a consequence of the first two trends, the distinction between the 
formal and informal sectors is becoming blurred, even breaking down. The 
difference in incomes to be earned in the two sectors is decreasing, and along 
with it the lifestyles and living conditions of households deriving their 
primary incomes from each. Insecurity of employment for formal sector wage 
earners makes their situation comparable in many ways to that of informal 
sector operators. With the fall in formal sector employment, erstwhile wage 
earners have moved into the informal sector, where they probably fare worse 
than the average economic agent there. While entry into the informal 
sector may be relatively free from an institutional point of view, unskilled 
wage earners are unlikely to possess the skills to engage in productive 
activities in the informal sector nor the capital to establish permanent 
commercial shops. In any case, productive activities such as shoemaking, 
tailoring, etc. must be key to the healthy expansion of the informal sector, 
since all of the new entrants cannot sustain themselves by selling to each 
other what third parties produce. Discharged wage earners drop into the lower 
reaches of the informal sector, which depresses even further the low incomes 
For evidence on this and on other events in the paragraph, see the 
JASPA document The informal sector in Africa (Addis Ababa, JASPA), 1985. 
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there. The distinction between the two sectors is becoming blurred also 
because of the deterioration in urban living conditions. Socialised services 
such as education, but particularly health, housing and sanitation, are 
considerably worse than a decade ago. While in the past observers stressed 
the net benefits of urban life as a magnet attracting migrants, the relevant 
emphasis now would be on the net cost of urban life. 
Fourth, there has been a substantial decrease in the income gap between 
urban wage earners and the rural population. This is the trend which most 
dictates a radical change in thinking about the dynamics of labour markets in 
SSA. In most countries, the gap between average urban incomes and average 
rural incomes has declined. But in some cases (see Nigeria, later), an 
increased average gap has gone along with a decline in the ratio of wage 
earner incomes to the incomes of farmers on smallholdings. The gap between 
the earnings of unskilled urban workers and peasant smallholders has declined 
to the point where it is in favour of the latter in some countries. As a 
consequence, wage earners have lost relatively to both peasants and the 
average level of income in urban areas. 
A fifth trend is a consequence of the above; overall distribution of 
income in most countries has worsened. Contrary to the conventional wisdom of 
the past, the narrowing of the rural-urban income gap has not improved income 
distribution but has been at the expense of both wage earners and small 
farmers. Increasingly, the countries of SSA are not characterised by a split 
between the privileged urbanites and the disadvantaged farmers but between the 
rich and the poor, where the latter include wage earners, informal sector 
operators, and small peasants. Evidence points to a substantial 
redistribution of income towards private sector entrepreneurs in a number of 
countries. While the rural sector is not our primary concern, it can be noted 
that there is evidence of increasing inequality there too. 
The sixth finding is that migration from rural to urban areas has not 
abated; if anything it appears to have increased. While data on this point 
are fragmentary and represent rough estimates, United Nations statistics show 
that the rate of urbanisation relative to the rate of population growth rose 
in the African region in the 1970s compared to the 1960s and that it is much 
higher than on the other developing continents. Given the previously 
discussed trends, this contradicts the simple model that makes migration 
dependent upon the gap between wages and rural incomes (equilibrated by 
unemployment in urban areas). According to this, an increase in urban 
migration implies a prior increase in the expected value of the urban-rural 
income differential. Yet the latter has declined sharply. Clearly, migration 
cannot be explained in these simplistic terms but is part of a much more 
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complex and dynamic survival strategy in the face of falling real incomes for 
the poor, both urban and rural. In fact, anthropological and sociological 
studies in Africa have generally challenged Todaro-type views of migration, 
stressing that income remittances make a strict division of urban and rural 
incomes of questionable relevance. 
As a consequence of the above six trends the dynamics of income 
distribution between urban and rural areas has changed. During the 1960s and 
1970s income distribution in the African region was analysed in terms of a 
rural-urban dichotomy, in which any differentiation among groups within each 
area was treated as secondary, if at all. It is certainly the case that in 
a number of countries of SSA in the immediate post-independence decade the gap 
in living standards between town and countryside was quite large. This gap 
quite probably included within it a substantial income differential between 
smallholder peasants and unskilled urban workers in the formal sector. It 
must be pointed out, however, that very little empirical work was done to 
support this view, and otherwise careful and responsible observers were 
content to accept it on the basis of casual empiricism and anecdotal evidence. 
As a consequence, modelling of labour markets in Africa proceeded with 
little reference to the complexities of rural-urban interactions, restricting 
itself to a few variables that fitted well into neoclassical labour market 
models. With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that it was extremely 
superficial to focus upon the interaction of peasants and urban workers when 
considering the dynamics of income distribution. Even the proposed mechanisms 
by which workers allegedly benefited at the expense of farmers did not involve 
direct trade-offs but processes requiring the mediation of other groups of 
economic agents whose role was largely ignored. Consider, for example, one of 
the most direct mechanisms - government control of food prices in urban 
areas. The distributional consequence of such a measure would seem obvious. 
Food crop farmers lose because prices are held below market levels; urban 
workers gain more than professionals, high-level civil servants and 
entrepreneurs because food represents a higher portion of the expenditure of 
lower-income groups. On reflection, the distributional effects are far from 
obvious. To take but one complication, lower food prices may permit formal 
sector entrepreneurs to pay lower money wages than would be the case without 
price controls or subsidies, and thereby reap higher profits. If productivity 
1 An example of how distribution was treated as an urban-rural 
phenomenon is given in the discussion of Kenya. 
6874d/v.5 
- 8 -
grows in formal sector firms and money prices are "sticky" downwards, the 
lion's share of the redistribution may be to profits. 
It was probably never correct to place primary emphasis upon the 
peasant-wage earner relationship when considering the dynamics of income 
distribution, particularly in the light of many anthropological and 
sociological studies that indicated a significant rate of urban-rural 
remittances. This stress on peasants and wage earners, implying the primary 
role of the urban-rural dichotomy, was not so much a theoretical insight as an 
empirical generalisation based upon the superficial symptoms of the 
post-colonial pattern of development. Its major analytical consequence was to 
obscure the class and wealth distinctions present in both rural and urban 
areas. 
Thus one arrives at the seventh major finding of this study, that in the 
last decade the primary dynamic distributional relationship in the African 
region has been between rich and poor within both the urban and rural 
sectors. Evidence on this is quite convincing and should come as no 
surprise. In a market economy during periods of depression, it is the weak 
and vulnerable groups that are least able to protect themselves against 
falling real incomes. In the last decade, these vulnerable groups have been 
wage earners (particularly the unskilled), urban informal sector operators, 
and peasants on smallholdings. 
The dynamics of economic crisis in the African region have resulted in a 
squeeze on wage earners, informal sector workers, and small peasants, with 
redistribution towards profits and large farmers. In countries where profits 
have also fallen, the average urban-rural income gap has in some cases fallen, 
but in other countries it has risen despite a fall in the peasant-unskilled 
urban wage earner gap. This tendency for the poor in both urban and rural 
areas to suffer has led to interactive rural-urban survival strategies whose 
precise nature is not clear. However, there is evidence (particularly in the 
extreme case of Uganda) of nominally urban households supplementing their 
livelihoods from agriculture. And, conversely, households of poor peasants 
seem to have sought income sources in the urban informal sector, which would 
partly explain the continuation of rural-to-urban migration despite falling 
farmer-worker income gaps. 
Before turning to an analysis of countries, one final trend should be 
noted. Fragmentary evidence indicates that, in a number of African countries 
(particularly Nigeria), the current economic crisis has stimulated or 
accelerated a tendency towards the economic differentiation of the peasantry. 
The consequence of this is that a growing portion of the rural population can 
no longer maintain itself on the land, either because of landlessness or 
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because of f ragmenta t ion . While t h i s tendency i s in i t s i n c i p i e n t s t ages and 
Africa is far from the s i t u a t i o n of Lat in America or Asia where l and l e s snes s 
i s r i f e , the dynamic consequences could be d r ama t i c . D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n provides 
a "push" of migra t ion to c i t i e s for which changes in the r u r a l - u r b a n income 
gap are l a r g e l y i r r e l e v a n t . In the context of s t agnan t or dec l i n ing formal 
s e c t o r employment, the r e s u l t i s to swell the urban informal s e c t o r , which has 
been growing beyond i t s absorp t ion capac i ty due to the f a l l in urban economic 
a c t i v i t y . This i n c i p i e n t t rend is an ominous development for the f u t u r e , 
c r e a t i n g for the Afr ican region a new and d e v a s t a t i n g wave of urban m i g r a t i o n . 
Summary of t r ends 
The major t rends r e l e v a n t to African urban labour markets which have been 
i d e n t i f i e d , a n t i c i p a t i n g t h e i r empi r i ca l v e r i f i c a t i o n , a re summarised below; 
1. Real wages of urban workers have f a l l e n , in some cases d r a s t i c a l l y , and 
p a r t i c u l a r l y for the u n s k i l l e d . 
2 . Secu r i t y and s t a b i l i t y of formal s e c t o r employment has been l a r g e l y 
e l i m i n a t e d . 
3 . In par t due to the previous two t r e n d s , the formal- informal d i s t i n c t i o n 
in urban a reas has become i n c r e a s i n g l y b l u r r e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y with r e spec t 
to the l i f e s t y l e s of households der iv ing t h e i r primary incomes from each 
s e c t o r . 
4 . There has been a genera l dec l i ne in the income gap between wage e a r n e r s 
and farmers , though t h i s has not n e c e s s a r i l y involved a dec l ine in the 
average r u r a l - u r b a n income g a p . 
5 . The d e c l i n e in the farmer-wage ea rne r income gap has not n e c e s s a r i l y 
improved the o v e r a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n of income, because of r e g r e s s i v e income 
s h i f t s wi th in both r u r a l and urban s e c t o r s . 
6. There is no evidence t h a t r u r a l - t o - u r b a n migra t ion has abated to any 
s i g n i f i c a n t degree , d e s p i t e the t rends l i s t e d above. 
7. I n c r e a s i n g l y the primary aspec t of income s h i f t s in the Afr ican region i s 
between poor and r i c h , wi th in both urban and r u r a l s e c t o r s and between 
s e c t o r s . 
8 . Economic d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n in r u r a l a reas is c r e a t i n g a pool of the r u r a l 




EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE BY COUNTRIES 
In this section, analysis is made of the countries of the region for 
which there is sufficient information to draw conclusions. First, we take in 
alphabetical order seven countries previously studied in detail by one of the 
authors of this paper. Other countries of SSA are subsequently organised by 
subregions. Because the evidence is from different sources and measurement of 
the same phenomenon subject to different methodologies, we do not construct a 
table summarising the quantitative data. Instead, at the end of the analysis 
a1 comparative table is provided with qualitative judgements on the various 
trends for each country. 
Kenya 
Kenya is a country whose economy has fared better than most in the region 
during the world recession. The period 1978-83, however, proved a contrast to 
past performance, with per capita income remaining virtually unchanged. 
Formal sector employment grew, though at a declining rate. This intensified 
the persistent problem of urban unemployment, a problem which has plagued the 
country for almost two decades. The Government perceived this as so serious 
that twice since independence (1970 and 1979) presidential orders required all 
formal sector employers to institute a once-and-for-all (or rather 
twice-and-for all, as matters developed) increase in their labour force - by 
10 per cent in the second decree. Whether these decrees had more than a 
transitory impact on employment level is a matter of controversy. 
Among African countries, Kenya has commonly been identified as suffering 
from a particularly large rural-urban income gap. Of 14 countries of the 
region for which there are comparable measures, Kenya ranked sixth from the 
top in the urban-rural income gap league table (1980). For nine countries for 
which the wage earner-farmer gap has been measured (late 1970s), Kenya is 
second only to the Cote d'lvoire. 
By all measures the rural-urban gap has been narrowing in Kenya, probably 
more or less continuously since independence. However, the "rural-urban gap" 
is an extremely complicated relationship in Kenya, where inequality within the 
urban and rural sectors is considerably greater than the inequality between 
the sectors by any measure. Rural inequality is particularly important. 
* V. Jamal: "Rural-urban gap and income distribution in Africa: 
Synthesis report of six countries" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 1982. 
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Kenya is one of the two countries in English-speaking Africa (Zimbabwe with a 
similar history being the other) characterised by a great degree of inequality 
in the distribution of land. This is a direct consequence of the 
settler-state nature of British colonial rule, in which large European estates 
were worked by Black Kenyans who had been coerced into wage labour through 
dispossession from their lands or imposition of "head" taxes. After 
independence, many Europeans sold their lands, some of which came into the 
hands of the post-colonial State and were redistributed. Other large estates 
were acquired by Black Kenyans and subdivided privately. However, large 
estates remain. In 1975, there were at least 2,148 farms of over 100 hectares 
in Kenya and at least 443 over 1,000. The numbers were virtually the same in 
1983 (2,200 and 440). Perhaps more significantly, the portion of marketed 
production arising from small farms, after being stable in the first half of 
the 1970s, fell from 55 per cent in 1975 to 51 per cent in 1983. These 
figures indicate that inequality worsened in the counryside between 1975 to 
1983, just as had occurred from 1969 to 1976. 
The importance of land distribution in rural Kenya thus signals that the 
term "rural-urban gap" is misleading: first, because there is great 
dispersion around average rural income (and not normally distributed); 
second, because this dispersion is changing (becoming more skewed); and 
third, because the relevant distributional dynamics are not primarily between 
town and country but between large farmers and small farmers. 
With these provisos we turn to consider the rural-urban gap itself 
(table 1). 
We see that the real wages of both rural and urban wage earners fell over 
the period 1969-83, the former by 25 per cent and the latter by 37 per cent, 
thus narrowing the differential between the two. On the reasonable 
presumption that the basic consumption basket is cheaper in rural areas than 
in urban areas (because food constitutes such a large proportion of 
expenditure and rents are lower in rural areas), the real standard of living 
Republic of Kenya, Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance 
and Planning; Statistical Abstract, 1984 (Nairobi, 1985), pp. 99 and 103. 
Jamal: "Rural-urban gap and income distribution in Africa: The case 
of Kenya" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 1982. To quote from that study, "... a 
bigger smallholder population had a smaller share of agricultural income, 
which of course means that intra-agricultural income distribution worsened 
The mechanism at work is nothing more complicated than the fact that 
large farmers by virtue of their great control over cash agriculture were the 




Table 1: Measures of urban and rural incomes in Kenya, 1969, 1976 and 1983 
1969 1976 1983 
Wagesa 
All urban (nominal) 
(price deflated) 
All rural (nominal) 
(price deflated) 




































a Kenyan pounds per annum. Both series deflated by low income cost of 
living index for urban areas. 
Kenyan pounds per annum. 1969 and 1976 from Jamal, Kenya, 1982; 
1983 estimate is by authors of this report. It should be noted that because 
of changes in the national income accounts (redefinition of non-monetary 
income) it is not possible to have a direct comparison with Jamal's 
monetary/non-monetary division of rural incomes. 
c A number greater than one indicates that urban incomes are higher. 
Sources: Republic of Kenya: Statistical Abstracts, 1978 and 1984, and Jamal, 
Kenya, 1982. 
of urban workers was in fact considerably less than twice that of rural 
workers. Second, the lowest-paid wage earners probably did much worse than 
average because the minimum wage for both rural and urban workers did not keep 
pace with average earnings. From 1978 to 1984, the urban minimum wage rose by 
54 per cent and the rural by 70 per cent. Average earnings in both sectors 
more than doubled in nominal terms. Inspection of distribution of earnings 
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tables in the Statistical Abstract confirms an increased clustering towards 
the bottom of the distribution. 
On the other hand, urban entrepreneurial income increased by 
considerably more than the wage bill - by 180 per cent from 1969 to 1976 -
and by slightly more than that from 1976 to 1983. Data on the number of new 
2 businesses and closures suggest that income per entrepreneur rose. While 
there are no direct measures of urban informal sector incomes (as elsewhere, 
this sector operates in camera in Kenya), once one nets out other incomes the 
residual imputed to the informal sector appears to have grown slower than the 
rate of urban migration. 
Thus, for Kenya, the trends identified in Part II are confirmed. Real 
wages fell over the last decade and a half, the rural-urban income gap 
narrowed, and overall income distribution worsened. Within both the rural and 
urban sectors inequality increased. Referring to the period 1969-76, Jaraal 
writes: 
... [T]here is considerable inequality in Kenya and that inequality 
worsened in the 1970s, with the deterioration in both the rural and urban 
sectors. ... In the urban sector the inequality arises from the not 
uncommon inequality between the wage earners and informal sector 
operators on the one hand and formal sector entrepreneurs on the other. 
Before moving on to the next country, we consider data which indirectly 
casts light upon conditions in the informal sector in urban areas of Kenya. 
These data pertain to the size distribution of establishments by economic 
sectors, 'and these are given in table 2. Statistics are given for three 
years, 1978, 1981 and 1983. From 1978 to 1981, real GDP grew by 12 per cent, 
and by half that rate from 1981 to 1983. The rates of growth of formal sector 
employment were virtually the same as the rate of growth of GDP. It is 
1 While the Statistical Abstract provides annual data on the 
distribution of earnings by income ranges, the ranges have changed over the 
years, making temporal comparisons difficult. In addition, total earnings 
relevant for the tables are not given, so a percentage distribution of 
earnings by income range is not possible even for a single time period. 
2 The Crawford-Thorbeck study of income distribution came to quite 
sanguine conclusions about the degree of inequality in Kenya. The study 
completely ignored entrepreneurial income, an example of the pitfalls of 
laying primary emphasis upon urban-rural differences in income. Eric Crawford 
and Eric Thorbeck: "Employment, income distribution, poverty alleviation and 
basic needs in Kenya" (Geneva, ILO), 1978. A critique of the study is found 
in Jamal, Kenya. 
Jamal: Kenya, p. 58. 
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Table 2; Size distribution of establishments in Kenya, 1978, 1981 and 1983 
(all figures percentages) 
No. employed Establishments Employment 






































100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 







100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number - 14 563 16 078 - 397 661 425 163 
* Includes construction, transport, trade and services. Excluded are 
agriculture, finance and banking. 

































reasonable thus to presume that urban labour markets experienced increasing 
excess supply during these years, particularly so after 1981. 
It is in this context that one interprets table 2. For both 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors the proportion of very small 
establishments in the total increased. Manufacturing establishments with less 
than five employees represented approximately 42 per cent of the total in 1978 
and 1981, and this rose to 47 per cent in 1983. In non-manufacturing 
activities, the proportion rose from 54 to 58 per cent. These figures suggest 
a shift of employment toward small, informal sector establishments, though the 
proportion of enumerated employment involved is tiny, as the table shows. 
However, the table does indicate a shift in the composition of employment 
from the largest to the medium-sized and smallest establishments. This shift 
is more obvious when one recalls the presidential decree of 1979, ordering 
firms to increase employment by 10 per cent. There is general agreement that 
the greatest impact of this decree was felt by large, foreign-owned 
enterprises, which were most subject to scrutiny. It is perhaps for this 
reason that the employment share of firms hiring more than 49 persons rose in 
1981. Given that formal sector employment was growing slowly compared to past 
experience, urban labour markets were in excess supply, and real earnings were 
falling, it is reasonable to conclude that employment in very small 
enterprises expanded under worsening conditions for the employed. This 
conclusion is consistent with the earlier evidence that income distribution 
worsened in Kenya over recent years. 
Lesotho 
Lesotho's economic life, and to a distressing extent its room for 
political independence, is dominated by the migration of workers to South 
Africa. Of tremendous importance to the personal disposable income of people 
in Lesotho, migration also plays a central role in the strategy of the South 
African Government to maintain labour surplus conditions in the Black 
"homelands", thereby keeping wages low and Black workers in a weak bargaining 
2 position. According to the census of 1976, 153,000 workers from 
There is obviously under-counting of the smallest establishments. 
Here we presume that this under-counting is systematic from year to year, so 
the information can be taken as indicative of short-term changes. This 
particularly applies to conclusions about employment shifts. 
2 For a discussion of labour markets in South Africa, see J.B. Knight: 
"Labour allocation and unemployment in South Africa", in Bulletin (Oxford 
Institute of Economics and Statistics), Vol. 40, No. 2 (1978). 
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Table 3; Distribution of the labour force of Lesotho, 1976 
(thousands) 
Male Female Total 
Total 286 279 565 
Employment in Republic of South Africa 129 24 153 
Employment in Lesotho 157 255 412 
Wage employment 18 12 30 
Self-employment 139 233 392 
Source: Jamal: "Rural-urban gap and income distribution in Africa: The case 
of Lesotho" (Addis Ababa; ILO/JASPA), 1982. 
Table 4: Number of Lesotho nationals employed in South Africa, 1967-78 
(thousands) 
1967 1972 1975 1976 1977 1978 
Mining 
Others 





















Lesotho were employed in South Africa in that year, accounting for 25 per 
cent of the active labour force aged 15 to 64. For males in this age group 
the proportion was 45 per cent. The numbers given in tables 3 and 4 show that 
the importance of migration increased slightly from 1967 to 1978. At the 
margin, one-half of the increase in the labour force over this ten-year period 
went, to South Africa. The role of Lesotho as a labour reserve for capital in 
South Africa goes back to before the days of the UN-mandated territories, and 
the dynamic effects upon the economy of Lesotho have been pervasive. 
Labour migration is at the heart of Lesotho's long-term development 
problems, rendering the country in effect a poor province of South Africa. 
One ratio indicates the source of the problem - in the late 1970s, the wage 
for unskilled labour in the mines of South Africa was five times average rural 
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income in Lesotho (Rands 1,077 per annum compared to about 200). In 
contrast, the urban-rural income differential within Lesotho is small and of 
secondary consideration. It is the lure of the income gap between farming and 
working in the mines (despite the degrading conditions there) which draws 
workers in the thousands from the countryside of Lesotho. It would be hopeful 
to find that remittances from workers have been used to improve and develop 
peasant agriculture in Lesotho, but all evidence is to the contrary. Indeed, 
it would be irrational for peasants to use remittances in this way. The 
income gap between agriculture and mining is so great and the prospect of 
closing that gap so improbable and long run that investment in agriculture is 
an unattractive choice for the individual. This is a clear case in which 
labour markets operate to create a contradiction between individual and 
collective interests. 
Official government estimates for the late 1970s measure remittances in 
the region of 40 per cent of GDP. The impact on agriculture of the proximity 
to South Africa goes beyond this. South African agriculture, mechanised and 
using cheap Black labour, determines the prices of food products in Lesotho. 
Competition and market forces generated within the South African economy have 
the major impact on local production rather than any subsidy on imports or 
price controls. The negative ef„fect of competition from South African 
agriculture and migration are the fundamental causes of the enormous 
urban-rural income gap in Lesotho, not any "urban bias" in development 
strategy. Further, the connection between the two countries has a direct and 
distorting effect on urban wages. If wages in Lesotho do not keep pace with 
those in the Republic of South Africa, semi-skilled and skilled labour will 
migrate to the mines. This link is shown in the relationship between the 
basic mining shift rate and the unskilled wage in Lesotho. From 1972 to 1978, 
the former rose almost sixfold, while the latter increased fourfold. By 
comparison, agricultural value added in Lesotho rose less than 50 per cent, 
2 
and was less than a third of the earnings of migrants to South Africa. 
Lesotho is indeed "the exception that proves the rule". Contrary to our 
generalisation in Part I, we find that urban real wages rose in Lesotho in the 
1970s. This has not been the result of any government policy as such nor of 
economic trends within Lesotho, but the consequence of labour migration to 
South Africa. Still, when one factors in remittances, rural households enjoy 
1 Jamal: Lesotho, 1982. 
2 Jamal: Lesotho, 1982. 
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a standard of living considerably higher than households of unskilled workers, 
about on par with the earnings of the serai-skilled workers. As has been 
stressed, this does not reflect the healthy state of agriculture, but the 
contrary. 
Nigeria 
Few economies in Africa have been so dramatically altered in the last 20 
years as Nigeria's. In 1965, Nigeria was primarily an agricultural country 
and agriculture accounted for virtually all of its exports. Despite 
controversy over the role of the state marketing boards, agriculture had 
performed quite well since the end of the Second World War. While growth was 
not spectacular, it was steady, and the balance of payments position 
manageable. Twenty years later, Nigeria is a major oil producer, and the 
result has been, at best, mixed. Certainly the political consequences of the 
discovery of major oil reserves were initially tragic, for few would deny that 
the sudden prospect of oil wealth prompted the civil war which raged in the 
south-east for half a decade. The economic consequences have been no less 
disturbing. Agriculture has virtually collapsed, the Government faces an 
unmanageable balance of payment situation, and the country is burdened with a 
foreign debt whose payment is problematical. Schatz has argued that except 
for the oil sector, the economy has had no significant growth since the early 
1970s. If oil wealth has not been a curse for Nigeria, it certainly has 
not been an unmixed blessing either. As shall be shown, all of the trends 
identified in Part I hold for Nigeria, and this is in no small part due to the 
distorting effect that oil had upon the economy. This distorting effect is 
indicated by the finding that although the overwhelming majority of the net 
earnings from petroleum never reached rural areas, urban poverty in Nigeria 
increased substantially during the oil boom, while the degree of rural poverty 
2 
probably remained unchanged. 
1 Sayre P. Schatz: "Pirate capitalism and the inert economy of 
Nigeria," in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1984). A 
similar view is found in the World Bank country report on Nigeria (Nigeria 
basic economic report (Washington, DC, IBRD, 1981)) and in Jamal; "Rural-urban 
income gap and income distribution: The case of Nigeria" (Addis Ababa, 
ILO/JASPA), 1982. See also his 1986 paper "Poverty and inequality in Nigeria" 
(Geneva, ILO), raimeo. 
^ "Allowing that there have been no drastic changes in acreage 
distribution or (apparently) big increases in the total rural population, this 
means that there is still very roughly the same number of rural poor. However, 
there must have been a big increase in the number of urban poor." ILO/JASPA: 
First things first: Meeting the basic needs of the people of Nigeria (Addis 




Rural-to-urban migration has been a major phenomenon in Nigeria since 
before independence, and in the last ten years major cities - Lagos, Kano, 
Kaduna, Port Harcourt, and Warri - have grown with almost astounding 
rapidity. The wealth generated by petroleum partly explains this growth 
(particularly for cities such as Port Harcourt and Warri), but urban migration 
is an older phenomenon which the oil boom intensified. 
While Nigeria has the largest wage labour force in the African region, it 
remains a small portion of the economically active population. In recent 
years it has probably declined relatively to the urban labour force, for the 
urban population has grown considerably faster than formal sector 
employment. As elsewhere in Africa, social services such as education, 
health, and sanitation are more available in urban areas than rural ones. It 
is open to question whether the poor in urban areas benefit much from these 
amenities. On a continent characterised by considerable urban blight, the 
cities of Nigeria probably excel all others in their wretched living 
conditions. This is particularly the case for Lagos, whose basic services are 
2 
inadequate on average and largely non-existent for the poor. Ironically, 
conditions worsened during the oil boom. Urban migration increased 
substantially, but this did not prompt the authorities to use the revenues to 
maintain urban conditions, much less improve them. When considering 
rural-urban differences in living standards in the Nigerian context, the 
socialised benefits of town life should probably be considered as negative. 
Particularly in the south of the country the net amenities found in large 
villages and small towns exceed those of Lagos, Port Harcourt and Warri when 
one factors in pollution, the absence of garbage and waste collection, and 
grossly inadequate transport facilities. These problems worsened in the last 
ten years. To give but one concrete example, much of the expansion of formal 
sector employment in the booming cities occurred in plants far from the areas 
where workers live, increasing non-discretionary costs of city life (as well 
as reducing leisure time). 
See O.J. Fapohunda, J. Reijmerink and M.P. van Dijk: "Urban 
development, income distribution and employment in Lagos", World Employment 
Programme Research Working Paper (Geneva, ILO), 1975. 
2 
A history of urbanisation of Lagos and description of conditions 
there in the mid-1970s is found in O.J. Fapohunda and Harold Lubell (with 
J. Reijmerink and M.P. van Dijk): Lagos: Urban development and employment 
(Geneva, ILO), 1976. 
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Table 5 provides estimates of agricultural and non-agricultural incomes 
in Nigeria for selected years 1970-1983. Two points should be noted: first, 
this measure does not indicate rural-urban diffferentials as such, since rural 
incomes include some non-agricultural earnings and second, the measure does 
not reveal the wage earner-farmer income differential, for all 
non-agricultural incomes are aggregated. What the table shows is that the oil 
boom coincided with a substantial decline in agricultural incomes relatively 
to non-agricultural incomes. This is hardly surprising, since petroleum 
revenue is by definition non-agricultural. 
More instructive of distributional changes is table 6, though the series 
here ends with 1978-79. Here income is divided into rural and urban 
recipients. As with the agricultural/non-agricultural ratio we see that the 
average gap between urban and rural households has increased. However, the 
gap between unskilled wage earners and rural households has declined. As a 
result of the oil boom there was a tremendous increase in urban incomes, but 
little of this increase filtered down to the great majority of urban workers. 
The years shown in the table are when the revenues from oil were the greatest 
(including the years of large price increases, 1973-74 and 1979). During the 
period, average urban incomes rose in every year but 1974-75, increasing by 
over 30 per cent. At the same time, average rural incomes remained more or 
less constant, so the average rural-urban gap rose from 3.4 in 1973-74 to 4.6 
in 1978-79. 
However, the ratio of unskilled wage earner incomes to rural incomes did 
not rise over the six years. It fell, if one takes 1974-75 as the benchmark, 
or remained about the same on the basis of the 1973-74 value. The large 
increase in this ratio in 1974-75 reflects the institutional manner in which 
wages are set in Nigeria. Beginning in the Second World War, colonial 
authorities adjusted wages through the creation of special wage review 
commissions. This practice was continued after independence, with wage 
reviews about every five years. As a consequence, the typical pattern for 
wage movements in Nigeria is a sudden and substantial money increase, followed 
by money wage stability and falling real wages (due to inflation). The 
periodic large increases have misled some observers to conclude that trade 
unions in Nigeria have been historically quite powerful and able to lay claim 
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Table 5: Agricultural and non-agricultural income in Nigeria, 1970-83 






































Table 6: Measures of rural and urban incomes in Nigeria, 1973-79 
(measured in 1977-78 Naira per annum) 



































































* UFY, urban family income; RFY, rural family income; and UUW, urban 
unskilled wage. 
Source: ILO/JASPA: First things first; and Jamal: "Rural urban gap and 
income distribution: The case of Nigeria" (Addis Ababa, JASPA), 1982. 
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to real wage increases in excess of what labour market conditions would 
warrant. This view is now largely discredited. 
During the 1970s urban wage earners only temporarily improved their 
position compared to farmers, and lost considerably compared to other urban 
groups. Since there was heavy rural-urban migration during the decade, in 
excess of the rate of growth of formal sector employment, it is extremely 
unlikely that incomes in the urban informal sector grew. In a study done by 
2 one of the authors it was concluded that their incomes fell. This leaves 
one with the conclusion that the "winners" from Nigeria' s windfall of oil 
revenues were the professionals and formal sector emtrepreneurs (particularly 
the latter, who benefited also from tariff protection on their commodities). 
Falling urban real wages and declining or stagnant incomes in the informal 
sector resulted in an increase in urban poverty, from 33 per cent of 
households in 1973 to 38 per cent in 1978, according to Jamal's estimate (up 
3 
to 5.2 million urban households). Labour market conditions so deteriorated 
for urban workers that it appears that in the late 1970s the historic pattern 
in which public sector wages were higher than private sector wages for 
comparable occupations was reversed. This reversal implies that private 
sector earnings, particularly for the low-paid, reflected labour market 
conditions. 
The 20-year pattern of price-deflated wages is shown in table 7. While 
no strong trend manifests itself in either the unskilled average wage nor the 
government minimum wage, it is clear that re.al wages in the early 1980s were 
below their level at the outset of the oil boom, 1974-76. Further, wage 
restraint and inflation since 1983 have led to further erosion of real wages. 
The allegation that Nigerian wage workers have been well-paid - itself 
discredited by a number of researchers - is no longer true. 
Thus, one can conclude that the tendencies of the 1970s in Nigeria -
falling real wages, increased urban poverty and inequality, and depressed 
Rimmer concludes, "... the gains won by Nigerian wage earners have 
been transitory in real terms ... [R]eal wages and salaries have tended to 
deteriorate throughout formalised employment". He goes on to generalise this 
to all of West Africa, "... institutional forces appear not to have produced, 
since about 1960, any sustained improvement in the pay of persons in 
formalised employment, and marked reductions in real wages appear to have 
occurred in some countries". Douglas Rimmer: The economies of West Africa, 
London (Weidenfeld & Nicholson), 1984, pp. 105, lWi 
2 Jamal: Nigeria, 1982. 
3 ILO/JASPA: F i r s t things f i r s t . . . . 
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Table 7; Unskilled average wages and minimum wages in Nigeria, 1964-83 
(1973=100) 
Year Unskilled Deflated Government minimum wage 


































































Source: Jamal: Nigeria, 1986, p. 14. 
informal sector incomes - have intensified in the 1980s. The glut on the 
world petroleum market has brought on a severe economic crisis in Nigeria, as 
manifested by the declining GDP, a large balance of payments deficit, and an 
unmanageable foreign debt position. Real wages have continued to fall along 
with formal sector employment. Whether or not the new Government can reverse 
these trends remains to be seen. It recently rejected an IMF austerity 
package in part because of its implications for the poor. 
The trends identified in Part I are verified for Nigeria, and this is all 
the more tragic because of the great (and lost) opportunities presented to the 
country's leaders during the 1970s. Clearly sudden riches are not a 
sufficient condition for the amelioration of poverty and inequality. Finally, 
it should be noted that a number of researchers, notably Lubell, have argued 
that one trend coincident with the oil boom has been the concentration of 
ownership of high-quality agricultural land, particularly near major cities 
1 "As to the gains won [by Nigerian workers] in 1980-81, it seems that 
about one-half had been lost through rising prices by the end of 1981", Rimmer 
(1984), p. 105. 
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(Lubell's research was on Kano). This raises the spectre of increased urban 
migration generated by landlessness to add to Nigeria's other problems. 
Sierra Leone 
Sierra Leone is a small West African country experiencing the effects of 
a depressed world market for minerals. Here the main mining products have 
been diamonds and iron ore. Production of the latter ceased completely in 
1975 because of world market conditions. Though the iron ore sector has been 
reactivated, prospects are bleak (as in Liberia - see below). Diamonds, an 
enviable export in the past, have suffered world price declines. There seems 
little doubt that the economy of Sierra Leone is now paying the price for its 
high degree of openness. Indeed, the United Nations places Sierra Leone in 
the category of developing countries most affected by global economic 
disturbances. As serious as the fall in primary product prices has been the 
virtual disappearance of foreign capital inflows. Through the 1970s the trade 
balance was negative, and covered by official capital inflows. In 1981 
official capital flows fell to 5 per cent of their level the previous year. A 
portion of the decline was made up by borrowing from private banks on 
relatively unfavourable terms. 
While it is an extremely poor country, Sierra Leone is characterised by 
large inequalities in income distribution, particularly in urban areas. 
Evidence indicated a considerable rural-urban dichotomy - urban areas 
accounted for only 20 per cent of population in the early 1980s and received 
at least half of national income. But the primary basis of inequality was 
between the urban elite on the one hand, and wage earners, informal sector 
operators, and the peasantry on the other. Indeed, the differences in levels 
of income among these last three groups is relatively minor compared to their 
collective position vis-a-vis the urban elite. That this is not a recent 
phenomenon is shown in a study of urban migration by Levi. His data indicate 
that the relationship between wage earner and peasant incomes probably did not 
change from 1957 to 1970, and neither measure showed a significant coefficient 
with regard to the level of urban unemployment. 
The relationship between rural and urban incomes is shown in table 8. In 
1970-71, average urban per capita income was six times the average rural 
income. However, this includes mining incomes (wages and profits), which 
considerably distorts the comparison. Net of mining the ratio is 4.6, and 
1 J.F.S. Levi; "Migration from the land ...", in Bulletin (Oxford 
Institute of Economics and Statistics), Vol. 35, No. 4 (1973). 
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Table 8: Urban and rural incomes in Sierra Leone, 1970-71 and 1980-81 





































a The differential effect of inflation is largely because increases in 
food prices have opposite effects upon the urban and rural populations. 
b AUY, average urban income; AAY, average agricultural income; AW, 
average wage income. 
Source; Jamal: "Poverty and inequality in Sierra Leone" (Geneva, ILO), n.d. 
fell to 3.0 in 1980-81. This ratio is considerably greater than the one 
between agricultural income and average urban wage income, which in 1970-71 
was only 1.3. By 1980-81, this ratio had dropped to considerably less than 
unity (0.7 in current prices and 0.6 in constant prices). To the extent that 
one can be startled by statistics, the last two lines in the table must take 
one aback - in 1980-81 the average wage earner was closer in income to the 
average peasant than he or she was to the average urbanite (where the latter 
average included wage earners themselves to pull it down). Alas, what at one 
time might have been thought a unique situation, has been replicated in other 
SSA countries recently. 
This dramatic shift in the relationship between wage earners and peasants 
has been in great part the result of rapidly rising prices of agricultural 
products, a trend common to most of the countries covered in this report. 
However, the shift in rural and urban incomes shown in the table may not be a 
recent phenomenon. Real wages for the unskilled were lower in the 1980s than 
they had been in the late 1950s (see table 9). Since per capita income is 
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Table 9; Index of unskilled wages in urban Sierra Leone, 1957-83 
Years Nominal Price deflated 
1958 - 107 
1961 100 100 
1965 109 107 
1970 145 91 
1974 174 115 
1977 195 83 
1981 241 60 
1983 353 74 
Sources: Price deflated wages for 1958, 1965 and 1970 from Levi (1973). All 
others from Jamal, Sierra Leone (n.d.). 
perhaps no lower now than 25 years ago, it follows that average wages have 
fallen relatively (and absolutely in constant prices) to per capita income 
over that period and not just in recent years. The extreme fall in real wages 
can be indicated by comparing the unskilled wage to a food basket providing 
the standard 2,200 calories per day per capita. It was estimated that in 1961 
and 1970 such a basket would have accounted for slightly less than 60 per cent 
of the budget of the typical family subsisting on the income of an unskilled 
worker; by 1983 the proportion had risen to 100 per cent. 
The deterioration in urban wages does not imply that peasant incomes have 
improved compared to wage incomes for the last 25 years (though they have in 
the last ten). Evidence indicates a substantial redistribution to profits 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, and this may have also been occurring 
earlier. Real wages for all categories of workers taken together have 
fallen. Because urban labour markets have been in increasingly excess supply 
it is difficult to imagine that informal sector incomes have risen in real 
terms. Following this line of argument, Jamal writes, "the trend in wages and 
informal sector incomes implies that the entrepreneur's income fared much 
better than those of the other two categories ... [T]he trends within urban 
areas thus point to the likelihood of a redistribution of income from the 
poorer groups on a substantial scale". 
The sharp fall in the unskilled urban wage, close to which the earnings 
of most workers are clustered, in great part explains the higher incidence of 
poverty in urban areas than in rural ones. Jamal estimates that in the late 
Jamali Sierra Leone (n.d.), p. 5. 
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1970s, 64 per cent of urban families were below the poverty line, compared to 
39 per cent of rural families. Further, the proportion of urban families with 
incomes less than that necessary to provide the standard 2,200 calories was 
double that in rural areas (20 per cent and 10 per cent). Thus, by some 
measures the rural-urban gap in Sierra Leone is in favour of rural 
households. This supports the point made before, that inequality in Sierra 
Leone is based on the dichotomy between the urban elite on the one hand, and 
workers, informal sector operators and peasants on the other. In the 
mid-1970s, the urban elite represented 6 per cent of the country's population 
and captured 34 per cent of national income. 
Traditionally, mining workers have been relatively well paid, but can no 
longer be considered privileged. Iron ore production was suspended in 1975, 
throwing thousands of men into unemployment. While production has now 
resumed, it has done so at a lower level of employment. Suspending production 
allowed the companies effectively to destroy the strength of the unions and 
hold money wages down. Workers in the diamond mines are still paid above the 
average for urban wage earners, but the number employed has declined and real 
earnings have fallen. 
The recent experience of Sierra Leone confirms the trends identified for 
sub-Saharan Africa: real wages have fallen sharply, public and private sector 
employment has declined, the rural-urban income gap has moved in favour of 
agriculture, and income has apparently been redistributed toward entrepreneurs 
and other elements of the urban elite. Sierra Leone demonstrates that a 
declining urban-rural income gap does not imply an improvement of income 
distribution. 
Somalia 
Somalia is a country whose economic characteristics are quite unique. It 
is a relatively non-urbanised country by regional standards, and in the 
countryside pastoral agriculture is the main source of livelihood. In most 
countries considered in this study pastoralism is a marginal phenomenon, 
though quite important for some ethnic groups, such as the Fulani in West 
Africa and the Masi in Kenya. Somalia is also unique because of the 
phenomenon of out-migration to the Gulf countries to seek employment and the 
importance of remittances in the economy. 
In 1970, this migration was insignificant but by the end of the decade it 
had become extremely important. The remittances of migrants and a second 
Jamal: Sierra Leone, 1982, pp. 14-15. 
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c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Somali economy, the g r e a t importance of t r a d e a c t i v i t i e s 
in urban a r e a s , make i t d i f f i c u l t to draw conc lus ions about r u r a l and urban 
incomes. Added to the d i f f i c u l t i e s of a s s e s s i n g u r b a n - r u r a l d i f f e r e n t i a l s , i s 
the con t roversy over the c o r r e c t measurement of milk produc t ion and 
consumption, the main s t a p l e of p a s t o r a l i s t s . J a m a l ' s measure of urban 
incomes, accepted as the most a c c u r a t e , a re given in t a b l e 10. The t a b l e 
shows a sharp f a l l in wage incomes in r e a l terms, by 60 per cent from 1970 to 
1980, and a 32 per cent r i s e in non-wage incomes. However, t h i s massive s h i f t 
between the two c a t e g o r i e s of income does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e a s h i f t 
betwen households . The non-average incomes a re p r i m a r i l y der ived from t r a d e . 
Given the ex tens iveness of t r ad ing a c t i v i t i e s and the t i ny s i z e of the formal 
s e c t o r labour fo rce , i t i s q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t most wage ea rne r households 
include members who r ece ive s u b s t a n t i a l non-wage incomes. F u r t h e r , wage 
ea rne r households rece ive cons ide r ab l e r emi t t ances from family members working 
abroad. 
With regard to r u r a l a r eas the inc idence of pover ty has been exaggerated 
in the p a s t , because of unde res t ima t ion of milk p roduc t ion and concep tua l l y 
2 
f a u l t y pover ty l i n e s . Reasonable e s t ima te s of milk consumption i n d i c a t e 
t h a t nomadic c a l o r i c in take i s adequa te , as wel l as being of h igher q u a l i t y 
than t h a t consumed by many c u l t i v a t i n g a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s elsewhere in the 
r eg ion . But i f the pover ty s i t u a t i o n in Somalia i s b e t t e r than g e n e r a l l y 
assumed and i f f a l l i n g wages do not n e c e s s a r i l y r e f l e c t d e c l i n i n g l i v i n g 
s t a n d a r d s , the o v e r a l l s i t u a t i o n s t i l l g ives cause for concern. Wages a r e not 
merely one input i n to a household income s t ream, but a l s o the monetary 
i ncen t ive for workers to d e d i c a t e themselves to t h e i r employment, seek s k i l l s , 
and g e n e r a l l y perform wel l on the j o b . When r e a l wages have f a l l e n by 60 per 
cent in a decade, i t i s hard to imagine t h a t the t i n y i n d u s t r i a l s e c t o r of 
Somalia i s des t ined to overcome the d i sadvantages of in fancy . Indeed, i t 
See Alan Hoben, e t a l . : "Somalia : A s o c i a l and i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
p r o f i l e " , Afr ican S tud i e s Cen t re , Boston U n i v e r s i t y , Working Paper No. S P - 1 , 
1983. See a l s o a j o i n t r epor t by the Minis t ry of Nat ional Planning and 
UNICEF; Women and c h i l d r e n in Somalia (Mogadishu, MNP/UNICEF), 1984 and two 
forthcoming (1987) r e p o r t s by ILO/JASPA: "Gen e r a t i n g employment and incomes 
in Somalia" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA, 1987) and UNICEF (Reginald Green and Val i 
J a m a l ) : "Somalia; Paradoxes of p r i v a t e p r o s p e r i t y , pover ty pocke t s , v o l a t i l e 
v u l n e r a b i l i t y and pub l i c p a u p e r i s a t i o n " (Mogadishu, UNICEF). A r epo r t by 
S t a t i s t i c s Sweden - (by Claes Norrlof) Nat ional Accounts Aggregates , 1977-86 
( P r e l . ) (Mogadishu), Ju ly 1987 - i n c o r p o r a t e s J a m a l ' s e s t ima te s of milk 
product ion in the Somalia n a t i o n a l accoun t s . 




Table 10; Real urban incomes in Somalia, 1970-80* 
Years Wages Non-wage income 
1970 3 984 11 231 
1974 3 876 13 316 
1977 2 863 12 755 
1978 3 041 13 474 
1980 1 645 14 811 
* Incomes measured in 1970 prices, shillings per annum. Wage incomes are 
after tax. 
Source: Jamal: "Rural urban gap and income distribution: The case of 
Somalia" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 1982, p. 61. 
appears that all productive sectors in the economy are in difficulty or 
decline. 
What the overwhelming impact of remittances points to is that the Somali 
economy suffers from distortions considerably more serious than those 
allegedly the result of "incorrect" relative prices, a point also made in the 
case of Lesotho. And if the economies of the oil states continue suffering 
difficulties, remittances may well decline drastically. In such a case, 
economic activity in urban Somalia would contract sharply. 
United Republic of Tanzania 
The United Republic of Tanzania has suffered severely from the world 
recession and its unique commitment to egalitarian development and meeting the 
basic needs of the population is threatened. The emphasis on equity has 
always been somewhat controversial, some even going so far as to argue that 
current difficulties are in great part due to domestic policies intended to 
2 
promote equity. In considering such arguments it may be pointed out that 
many countries in the African region are facing difficulties equal or worse 
than Tanzania's, none of which stand accused of having taken significant steps 
to improve income or wealth distribution. 
1 See ILO/JASPA's aptly titled employment mission report, Basic needs 
in danger (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 1982 for Tanzania's achievements in basic 
needs satisfaction and threats posed by current recession. 
2 
For a review of the evidence from the angle of the villagisat ion programme see P. Collier, S. Radwan and S. Wangwe, Labour and poverty in rural 
Tanzania (Oxford, Clarendon Press) 1986. 
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Tanzania's most pressing problem from a narrow economic viewpoint is the 
balance of payments. In the early 1980s current imports were double the value 
of current exports. This large trade deficit is partly the result of a 
decline in the volume of exports over the last ten years (at about minus 3 per 
cent per annum). Domestic policies contributed to the poor export 
performance, with blame particularly cast upon the villagisation programme, 
the role of product marketing boards, and the nationalisation of sisal 
estates. However, by any balanced judgement domestic policies can explain 
only a small part of the trade deficit. Tanzania's barter terms of trade 
declined sharply over the last ten years. In 1973 and 1980 the volume of 
imports was the same, but the cost in current prices was three times greater 
in the latter year. Had export volume grown at the average rate for all 
low-income countries over the period (about 5 per cent per annum), the trade 
deficit would still have been large and required external assistance to 
finance. In 1979 and periodically since then the Government entered into 
negotiations with the IMF to reach agreement on a high conditionality loan 
package. The negotiations were quite contentious. At issue were policy 
changes demanded by the IMF (e.g. devaluation and eliminating food subsidies) 
which would have a detrimental effect upon vulnerable groups. 
Throughout the 1970s and into the 1980s, the United Republic of Tanzania 
subsidised a number of basic foodstuffs. Maizemeal was perhaps the most 
important of these for the urban poor. Evidence indicates that the subsidy 
programme was successful in keeping down prices of foodstuffs, which fell in 
relation to the general price level during 1973-83. Success in avoiding 
shortages and parallel markets with higher prices was achieved through 
imports. In 1981 and 1982 imported cereals accounted for almost 70 per cent 
of subsidised sales. It has been argued that domestic policies are to blame 
for Tanzania's poor performance in export agriculture, and the same 
argumenthas been applied to food production - that low producer prices and the 
price-depressing effect of imports have discouraged production. 
While this argument has a certain logic in the abstract, it does not seem 
to be confirmed by available evidence. According to FAO statistics, during 
1978-81 the United Republic of Tanzania was one of only 11 countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa in which the per capita production of food rose. And 
while per capita production fell during 1982-84, the decline was slower than 
for the majority of countries. This is consistent with the view that imports 
of cereals have increased because domestic production declined, not 
1 FAO: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Vol. 7, No. 1, Dec. 1984. 
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the reverse. The hypothesis that the subsidy programme depressed food 
production remains speculative, while it is a fact that the consequence on low 
income urban families (which include wage earners) has been quite severe. 
Shortly after the subsidy was dropped (as part of an IMF agreement) the price 
of maizemeal per unit rose from 2.5 to 12 shillings. 
Even before abandonment of the subsidy programme, urban wage earners in 
the United Republic of Tanzania had suffered a near catastrophic fall in 
purchasing power, both absolutely and relatively to peasant cultivators. The 
basic information demonstrating this is shown in table 11. The data show an 
improvement in the relative position of wage earners from 1969 to the 
mid-1970s, then a deterioration which was considerably greater than the 
previous improvement. The reasons for this are not hard to find. From 1975 
to 1979 the Government imposed a freeze on wages, and at the same time food 
prices rose dramatically. 
Table 11: Urban and rural incomes in the United Republic of Tanzania, 1969-82 
(shillings per annum) 
1969 1972 1973-75 1978 1980 1982 
Rural; 
Smallholder 1 844 1 867 2 338 5 456 6 540 11 064b 
Urban wage: 
Aver.non-
Min.wage 1 920 2 460 3 587 4 560 5 360 
agr. 4 522 5 184 6 890 8 510 9 093 11 568b 
Ratios: 
ANa/Sm 2.4 2.8 2.9 1.6 1.4 
Mw/Sm 1.0 1.3 1.5 0.8 0.8 
Note: ANa, average non-agricultural wage; Sm, smallholder average income; 
Mw, minimum wage. 
Source: 1969-80 from Jamal; Rural-urban gap in Tanzania, p. 10; 1982 from 
ILO; Distributional aspects of stabilisation programmes in the 
United Republic of Tanzania (Geneva, ILO), 1985, p. 17. 
the reverse. The hypothesis that the subsidy programme depressed food 
production remains speculative, while it is a fact that the consequence on low 
income urban families (which include wage earners) has been quite severe. 
Shortly after the subsidy was dropped (as part of an IMF agreement) the price 
of maizemeal per unit rose from 2.5 to 12 shillings. 
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Even before abandonment of the subsidy programme, urban wage earners in 
the United Republic of Tanzania had suffered a near catastrophic fall in 
purchasing power, both absolutely and relatively to peasant cultivators. The 
basic information demonstrating this is shown in table 11. The data show an 
improvement in the relative position of wage earners from 1969 to the 
mid-1970s, then a deterioration which was considerably greater than the 
previous improvement. The reasons for this are not hard to find. From 1975 
to 1979 the Government imposed a freeze on wages, and at the same time fOQd 
prices rose dramatically. 
Two ILO reports provide an instructive way of comparing the trend in 
incomes of farmers and wage earners. Farmer and worker incomes are divided 
into food and non-food components. For farmers who produce and consume their 
own food, changes in food prices affect real purchasing power only for the 
marketed part of their output (they eat maizemeal, not the price of 
maizemeal). Wage earners must purchase all that they eat, so changes in 
prices affect their entire food consumption. On this basis the estimates show 
a 9 per cent increase in the real incomes of farmers from 1973-75 to 1980 
(table 12), while wage earner real incomes fell by 50 per cent. This dramatic 
drop in wage incomes resulted in cutting the income gap between the two 
groups, to a point where urban workers on average had a standard of living in 
1980 only 20 per cent higher than rural smallholders. 
The trends depicted above have continued, with workers continuing to lose 
absolutely and relatively to farmers. The minimum wage was increased in 1981, 
but this only momentarily checked the fall in workers' real incomes. Food 
prices continued to rise, and by 1983 the minimum wage was less than half its 
1969 value in real terms, and the non-agricultural wage earners had lost a 
catastrophic two-thirds of the purchasing power of their incomes. Table 13 
shows this, and the bare numbers are startling, virtually unprecedented in the 
2 
region with the exception of Uganda and Ghana. The effect this has had 
upon the condition of urban workers challenges the imagination. Knight and 
Sabot, writing in the early 1980s, lamented the stability of employment in 
urban the United Republic of Tanzania and its alleged implications for 
*- ILO: Distributional aspects of stabilisation in Tanzania (Geneva, 
ILO), 1985,": and Jamal; "Rural-urban gap and income distribution in Africa: 
The case of Tanzania" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 1982. 
"In ILO experience there have been few international comparisons; 
indeed, declines of much smaller magnitudes have sometimes been associated 
with much social unrest." ILO: Distributional aspects of stabilisation in 
Tanzania, p. 35. For the case of Uganda and Ghana, see later. 
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Table 12: Real income trends for farmers and wage earners in the United 
Republic of Tanzania, 1969-80 






















* Urban-rural income ratio, which differs from previous table because of 
effect of adjusting for urban and rural prices. 
Source; Jamal: Tanzania, 1982, p. 13. 
Table 13: Real wage trends in the United Republic of Tanzania, 1963-83 







































Source: Jamal: Tanzania, 1982 and 1985. 
allocative efficiency, commenting, "the lack of mobility reflected in part the 
payment of wages high by comparison with incomes outside of the modern 
sector. If this were once true, it is no longer so. So great has been the 
fall in real wages that it threatens one of the central elements in the 
Government's recovery programme -raising productivity and efficiency in state 
1 J.B. Knight and R.H. Sabot; "From migrants to proletarians: 
Employment experience, mobility and wages in the United Republic of Tanzania", 
in Bulletin (Oxford Institute of Economics and Statistics), Vol. 44 No. 3 
(1982), p. 224. 
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industries. When real wages fall to this degree, the result is 
absenteeism, reduced effort, and less commitment to formal employment because 
of the necessity to seek income supplements elsewhere. 
Under these circumstances it is extremely improbable that there has been 
any improvement in informal sector incomes. The more likely case is that they 
have fallen along with urban wage incomes. The fall may have been less, in as 
far as informal sector street vendors have benefited from increased prices. 
But the number of street sellers and small artisans has probably 
increased faster than the turnover of sales, because of continued urban 
migration and members of wage earner households entering the informal sector 
out of necessity. Estimates of informal sector incomes indicate that while a 
few owners of permanent shops earn more than the urban average, the great 
majority of operators receive considerably less than the average wage. This 
implies that a high proportion of households earning their livelihoods from 
2 
the informal sector fall below the poverty line. While urban real wages 
and informal sector incomes have fallen sharply in recent years, there has 
been a major shift in income from the poor classes to the elite in urban areas. 
These trends have been intensified by the policies associated with the 
"structural adjustment programme" pressured upon the Tanzanian Government by 
the IMF. The policies (e.g. devaluation, denationalisation) are familiar ones 
and of questionable relevance to the concrete circumstances of the current 
economic crisis in the United Republic of Tanzania. The programme reflects 
the general view of the IMF that inflation, trade deficits and fiscal deficits 
have the same cause in all countries and circumstances. "Structural 
adjustment" has a different meaning within the halls of the IMF than might be 
inferred by the intelligent layman. In the United Republic of Tanzania, as 
elsewhere, little change in the structure of the economy is foreseen by the 
3 
programme, except in as far as the measures would return the economy to 
1 "Unless real wages are reasonably protected it is quite unlikely that 
any amount of exhortation or the introduction of material incentive schemes 
will offset the erosion of worker performance." (ILO: The United Republic of 
Tanzania), 1985, p. 37. 
2 Jamal: Tanzania, 1982, pp. 33-36. 
"... the SAP (Structural Adjustment Programme) was ill-named since it 
foresaw very little structural change and is formulated more in terms of 
returning to the economic structure of the late 1970s." ILO: Stabilisation 
in Tanzania, 1985, p. 21. 
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an earlier more agriculturally based organisation in which the Government 
plays a smaller role. 
In anticipation of the final section of this report, a few comments on 
the Structural Adjustment Programme are called for. The devaluation which the 
IMF technicians demanded (and this is not too strong a word) seems singularly 
inappropriate in the Tanzanian context. In as far as its purpose was to shift 
the terms of trade towards agriculture, this had occurred with a vengeance 
prior to devaluation. If the primary purpose was to increase the return to 
export crops, its effect is open to question on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds, as we argue later, citing an econometric study of the Sudan. And 
there is a broader point to be made with regard to labour markets, the concern 
of this study. IMF structural adjustment programmes and IMF philosophy in 
general seem to incorporate the view that without exception wages are "too 
high" in developing countries. While the IMF frequently recommends policies 
to raise real interest rates, it rarely if ever suggests that wages are "too 
low" and should be raised. This asymmetry in policy reflects a particularly 
narrow view of how labour markets operate, namely that any excess of 
jobseekers over the available openings is evidence of wages being above the 
"market-clearing rate". In the final part of this report it will be argued 
that this view is incorrect, that the wage can be below its efficient 
allocative level without markets manifesting shortages as such - or rather, 
the shortages manifest themselves in a form that can be superficially 
interpreted as surpluses. 
The evidence indicates that in the United Republic of Tanzania there has 
been a dramatic shift in income from urban to rural areas, contradicting the 
view that there is a universal "bias" towards urban development in African 
countries. It should be noted that Ellis has challenged the allegation that 
there was ever an "urban bias" in Tanzania's development policy in the sense 
of a division between rural and urban interests as two distinct categories of 
pressure groups. Rather, he argues, the conflict was between a portion of 
the urban elite and the peasantry, and the surplus appropriation associated 
1 Frank Ellis: "Relative agricultural prices and the urban bias 
model; A comparative analysis of the United Republic of Tanzania and Fiji", 
in The Journal of Development Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, Apr. 1984, where he 
writes (p. 47); "... the urban bias model ... sidestep[s] the awkward reality 
of an intra-agricultural class differentiation, but in so doing it incorrectly 
divorces the political objectives of various rural classes from the material 
basis of their interests in agricultural production and agricultural land 
ownership;, behind this lies an unpreparedness to confront the really central 
political issues implied by championing the peasants ...". 
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with this conflict merely (and necessarily) took the form of emphasis upon 
urban development. In this process, urban wage earners were secondary and 
transitory beneficiaries, their gains quickly consumed by rising prices. 
The United Republic of Tanzania in recent years confirms the identified 
trends with a vengeance; real urban wages have fallen tremendously, formal 
sector employment has become less secure, the urban-rural income gap has 
closed, the formal/informal distinction is breaking down, and income 
distribution has worsened (at least in urban areas). The first trend, the 
fall in real wages, exceeds what has occurred elsewhere in the region with the 
exception of Uganda and Ghana. 
Uganda 
In the last 15 years perhaps no other African country has experienced as 
wide a range of misfortunes as Uganda. As in other African countries there 
were the negative impacts of the recession in the West, the oil price shocks, 
and inclement weather. But unique to itself, Uganda had to adjust to the 
break-up of the East African Community, to a war with the United Republic of 
Tanzania - and to General Idi Amin Dada as the supreme economic planner and 
political overlord. During a regime of singular economic mismanagement and 
repression he reduced a once prosperous and promising country to one of the 
poorest in the world. Amin's single most important foray into the economic 
field, and one which set off the decline, was his so-called War of Economic 
Independence against the Asian community in 1972. The consequent and almost 
predictable collapse of the modern sector that the Asians controlled, spread, 
through the breakdown of the infrastructure, to the export sector, bringing 
ruin to all other sectors. 
GDP figures show that between 1970 and 1980 aggregate monetary GDP fell 
by 25 per cent, implying a decline of around 42 per cent in per capita 
2 
terms. "Modern sector" GDP fell by as much as 55 per cent. Export 
1 The effect upon formal sector employment has been somewhat 
complicated, for the Government has sought to avoid creating redundancies in 
state enterprises. Whether or not this can be achieved, the deterioration of 
commitment to formal sector employment has dramatically altered the context 
for those employed. 
2 Figures in this paragraph are based on The Republic of Uganda; 
Background to the budget, 1984-85 (Kampala) 1984; for further details see 




production declined massively. In contrast, the food sector held up pretty 
11 l well. 
In terms of l i v i n g s t a n d a r d s , the economic c o l l a p s e in Uganda affeced 
most heav i ly the urban wage e a r n e r s . Both in the l a t e c o l o n i a l and e a r l y 
independence per iods Uganda was c l a s s i f i e d by a "high wage" p o l i c y , in tendedto 
2 
e s t a b l i s h a permanent "committed" wage labour force in urban a r e a s . 
Minimum wage had been r a i s e d fourfold s ince 1957, whereas expor t -c rop p r i c e s 
had dec l ined by 40-60 per c e n t . Such huge wage inc reases completely changed 
the na tu re of wage employment and s t r u c t u r e of incomes in Uganda. In 1957 the 
minimum wage would have bought only t h r e e - f i f t h s of the food requirements of 
an a v e r a g e - s i z e family in towns, using as the un i t of measurement the most 
b a s i c s t a p l e , matoke (green bananas) (see t a b l e 14); by 1967 only one-half of 
the minimum wage would have s u f f i c e d . In 1957 the average farm income 
( i n c l u d i n g subs i s t ence income) was t h r e e t imes the minimum wage; ten years 
l a t e r the minimum wage exceeded the average farm income by n e a r l y o n e - f i f t h . 
This s t r u c t u r e of incomes co l lapsed in the 1970s. Minimum wage f e l l to 10-15 
per cent of i t s 1972 value in the 1980s and would have bought no more than a 
week's supply of food. 
Such a massive f a l l in r e a l wages induced an equa l ly dramat ic change in 
the l i f e s t y l e o f . u r b a n wage ea rne r households . S imi l a r changes have happened 
in o ther African c o u n t r i e s by now; the Ugandan case s tands out because the 
changes occurred a t such a rapid pace and in such an extreme form. All t r i b e s 
had to reduce t h e i r consumption of the p re fe r red foods (meat, mi lk , f r u i t , 
e t c . ) which in the 1960s were absorbing a s i z e a b l e and growing p ropor t ion of 
t h e i r income. Even wi th in the category of s t a p l e foods there were swi tches , 
p a r t i c u l a r l y to maizemeal, which in r e l a t i v e terms became a cheaper source of 
c a l o r i e s than matoke. For the non-Baganda t r i b e s t h i s s i g n i f i e d a 
1 This judgement i s in c o n t r a s t to the assessment of the FAO, whose 
s t a t i s t i c s show a sharp d e c l i n e (17 per cent between 1972-74 and 1980-82 or 
from 2,141 c a l o r i e s per c a p i t a per day to 1,781 c a l o r i e s . ) Careful i n s p e c t i o n 
of the FAO data showed an underes t ima t ion of the " r o o t s and t u b e r s " group -
cassava, sweet p o t a t o e s , and p l a n t a i n s - which normally provide 40-50 per cent 
of t o t a l c a l o r i e s in Uganda. Nat ional f igures give 2,382 as the f igure for 
c a l o r i e a v a i l a b i l i t y in 1980-82. The FAO s t a t i s t i c s are from t h e i r food 
balance sheet computer p r i n t o u t s . The n a t i o n a l f igures used are from the 
Republic of Uganda; Background to the budget , 1984-85 (Kampala, 1984). 
In the l a t e 1960s one spoke of wage e a r n e r s as the " labour 
a r i s t o c r a c y " in Uganda - of course not in r e l a t i o n to non-African 
e n t r e p r e n e u r s , but African farmers . J . B . Knight : "The de te rmina t ion of wages 
and s a l a r i e s in Uganda", in B u l l e t i n (Oxford I n s t i t u t e of Economics and 
S t a t i s t i c s ) , Vol. 29, No. 3, Aug. 1967. 
6874d/v.5 
- 38 -








% of min. wage 
to purchase 























































da, 1985. Minimum wages up to 1972 from reports of 
minimum wages advisory boards and J.B. Knight;. "The determination of 
wages and salaries in Uganda", in Bulletin (Oxford University 
Institute of Economics and Statistics), Vol. 29, No. 3, 1967, pp. 
233-264; after 1972 from information provided by the Ministry of 
Labour. Price index from Uganda; Statistical abstract and idem; 
Background to the budget, various years. Figures in the last column 
derived from matoke price data. 
continuation of past trends; for the Baganda it signified a major departure 
in their diet patterns. 
Alteration of diet still left a large gap between family subsistence 
needs and income. To compensate, wage earner households re-established links 
with the countryside, reversing the labour force stabilisation process of the 
1960s. Trips back to the family farm (shamba) became common and some members 
of the family were actually permanently sent back to tend such farms. More 
significantly, urban families began to grow their own food, something that had 
always happened, but was on the decline because of increasing "specialisation" 
and influx of non-landowning migrants. With the departure of these migrants 
Kampala became more a Baganda city than it ever was - and with the cultivation 
of food crops a more rural city. Before 1972 most urban budget surveys showed 
that Kampala was 20 per cent self-sufficient in calories; in the 1980s that 
figure quite likely doubled. 
The second structural change that took place involved the break-up of the 
wage-earning class. With the wage down to 10-15 per cent of its value, a 
person also effectively worked that much less. Some of his free time he 
6874d/v.5 
- 39 -
devoted to organising side activities and this meant "business", the buying 
and selling of small items of consumer goods. More significantly the wage 
earners' family members took to this kind of trading, the opportunities for 
which increased because of the gap left by the Asians. Compared to pre-1972 
one is struck by the visible increase in street trading. As stated 
previously, something like that has now happened in most African cities, but 
in Uganda the reasons were different, for the fact is that unlike other 
African countries migration actually slowed down or even changed 
direction. And yet the informal sector grew. What happened was that a 
great part of the trade previously in the hands of the Asians was shared by an 
increasing number of petty traders. Thus, we have the phenomenon of the 
expansion of the informal sector without migration. The culmination of these 
two changes was that after the mid-1970s the distinct classes that had existed 
in urban Uganda in the 1960s coalesced into a grand trader-cum-wage 
earner-cum-shamba growing class and the final outcome was that while urban 
incomes fell quite sharply, the total income available to urban groups from 
trade and wages and own-farming still kept them above basic food poverty. 
Ghana 
Ghana is a country which has had a particlarly poor growth performance 
since independence in the mid-1950s, but the oil price increases and 
subsequent world recession worsened matters considerably. The major 
agricultural export is cocoa, and a common conclusion by observers is that 
peasants producing this crop have been denied the gains to which their labours 
entitled them, both historically and recently. Cocoa is commercialised, as in 
other West African countries, through a state marketing board, and during the 
1970s peasants received a producer price less than one-quarter of the world 
market price. 
Notwithstanding what some have called the "exploitation" of the cocoa 
farmer by the State, rural/urban income differences in Ghana are surprisingly 
low, perhaps the lowest in West Africa. Knight's work indicated a very narrow 
The growth rates (percentage per annum) of the four largest towns 
between 1969 and 1980 were as follows: Kampala 3.2; Jinja -0.7; Mbale 1.7; 
Tororo 0.5. Compared to this, the overall population growth rate was 2.8 per 
cent. Now up to 1972 the towns were growing at 5-6 per cent per annum. Thus 
between 1973 and 1980, all towns (including Kampala) registered lower growth 
rates than the natural population increase, implying reverse migration. 
Source, Republic of Uganda: Background to the budget, 1982-83 (Kampala, 1982) 
table 1.26, p. 50. 
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gap between wager incomes and peasant incomes in the late 1960s, narrow enough 
to conclude that the difference was within the range of measurement error. 
More recent work, using a different method so it is not comparable, also shows 
2 
a relatively small gap. 
Despite the heavy implicit taxation of cocoa through marketing boards, it 
appears that cocoa farmers on average earn more than urban workers. As cocoa 
farmers are the rural elite, this is to be expected. A more recent 
development is the dramatic improvement of producers of foodstuffs compared to 
urban wage earners. From 1974 to 1980, prices of foodstuffs rose thirtyfold, 
and the ratio of these prices to the prices of urban-produced commodities 
3 
which farmers buy increased by 52 per cent over the same period. While no 
direct measure of the rural-urban income gap is available for the last ten 
years, an ILO study concludes that "there are signs that the real value of the 
urban-rural income (gap) may have been reduced by the differential action of 
inflation since 1974-75 ...". 
Food producers have done relatively well because urban wage earners have 
fared so wretchedly. Rimmer calculated that the minimum wage fell by 25 per 
cent in real terms from 1963 to 1975. Tabatabai has made calculations for 
more recent years, which are given in table 15 along with relevant relative 
price indices. The time series shows a massive drop in real wages, of over 80 
percentage points from 1970 to 1983-84. There may have been some improvement 
in 1985-1986, for the real minimum wage rose. Even then the absolute level 
remains a tiny fraction of its value in the early 1970s. 
There is no direct evidence of changes in overall income distribution in 
Ghana in recent years, but some reasonable inferences can be drawn on the 
1 Knight (1972). 
ILO/JASPA (Dudley Jackson): "Rural-urban gap and income distribution 
in Africa: The case of Ghana" (Addis Ababa, 1982). See also H. Tabatabai: 
"Economic decline, access to food and structural adjustment in Ghana" (ILO, 
Geneva), 1986, which we use extensively below. 
3 ILO/JASPA: Ghana, p. 77. 
^ ILO/JASPA: Ghana, p. 76. Tabatabai has questioned the extent to 
which the increased retail and wholesale prices for food benefited producers. 
He concludes that farm-gate prices for foodstuffs probably fell relatively to 
the composite price index over the 1970s and during the early 1980s (p. 10). 
Notwithstanding this, he also concludes that "food farmers did extremely well 
as compared with wage earners and cocoa farmers" (p. 20) and the income gap 
between agricultural and non-agricultural incomes narrowed (p. 21). 
-> Douglas Rimmer; The economies of West Africa (London, Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1984), p. 103. 
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Table 15; Price-deflated wages and relative prices, Ghana, 1970-85 
Relative prices 

































































































a Daily minimum unskilled wage, divided by national consumer price 
index-
Manufacturing monthly average earnings divided by national consumer 
price index. 
c Average earnings of agricultural employees, divided by rural price 
index. 
Wholesale price of food, divided by urban price index. 
e Producer price of cocoa divided by urban price index. 
Source: Tabatabai, 1986. 
basis of the previous discussion. As the Appendix table 5 shows, GDP in real 
terms rose in Ghana from 1978 to 1983, though by less than the population 
grew. During this period, real wages fell, as did employment, so the wage 
share declined. In rural areas, the earnings of cocoa farmers also fell, for 
their terms of trade with urban consumer commodities fell sharply (an aspect 
of the rapid inflation mentioned above). While incomes of food crop producers 
improved relatively, it is unlikely that they rose enough to offset these two 
declines. Further, real tax revenues fell, largely the result of the fall in 
world cocoa prices. If the net gain of urban workers, farmers and the 
Government was negative, then the net gain of other groups must have been 
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positive (even if per capita income fell slightly). Since the salaries of 
high-level civil servants also fell, and it is unlikely that informal sector 
incomes rose with urban labour markets in excess supply, it follows as a 
likely possibility that entrepreneurs and rentiers were net "winners" in this 
period of inflation and extremely slow growth. This conclusion is not 
contradicted by the possibility of net transfers abroad, whose likely source 
would be profits. 
Once again, the case of Ghana confirms several of the trends identified 
in Part I - falling real wages, instability of formal sector employment, a 
narrowing of the rural-urban gap (with respect to food crop producers at 
least), and a probable worsening of the overall distribution of income in the 
country. Finally, anecdotal evidence suggests that migration to urban areas 
has continued. The latter is quite believeable in the context of Ghana, where 
migration has never been associated with a large rural-urban income 
differential. 
Liberia 
Particularly hard-hit by the world recession have been the smaller 
countries of the region with open economies, for this combination is lethal 
when world markets are unstable. Openness allows external shocks to be 
transmitted to the domestic economy quickly, and small size means that what 
would be a minor and passing disturbance for a large economy is a devastating 
blow for a small one. When these two characteristics are combined with an 
undiversified export package, the results are catastrophic indeed. Liberia is 
a case in point, a small economy in which an undiversified export package was 
equivalent to over 60 per cent of GDP for the last 15 years. Liberia's major 
export, iron ore, has fared particularly poorly during the world recession, 
with little the Government could do to improve the situation. Were the 
Government able in some manner to make Liberian iron ore more competitive on 
the world market, this would necessarily be at the expense of other producing 
countries, for the stagnation of world steel production ensures that the total 
market is unlikely to grow. Even the grab-all remedy of devaluation is not 
available since the US dollar serves as the national currency. 
Liberia is a country characterised by great inequalities, one aspect of 
which is rural-urban. It is important to note, however, that rural-urban 
inequality in Liberia is not the result of "urban bias" as such, but rather is 
symptomatic of (or the form taken by) the historic class and cultural division 
between the elite descended from immigrants (freed slaves from the United 
States) and the indigenous population. Policies to reduce rural-urban 
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inequality confront the deeply rooted political and economic power of the 
elite families in the country. 
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to find that the average 
rural-urban income gap in Liberia is measured to be relatively low by regional 
standards. For the 17 countries covered by ILO studies, only three had 
ratios in 1980 less than Liberia's 4.2. It is to be noted that this is the 
average ratio for all incomes urban and rural, and the former include mining 
wages, which are considerably higher than the average for all wages. The 
ratio of average income for workers' households in Monrovia to all farmers and 
rural self-employed was only 2.3 in 1977/78. And while mine workers have been 
the better-paid wage earners, the ratio of miners' households to rural 
households was also below the average urban-rural ratio in the same years, at 
2 . . . 
3.7. From these fragmentary pieces of information, one may conclude that 
the mean income of urban workers and of miners must lie below the urban mean; 
i.e., wage earners were not a privileged group to any great extent in Liberia 
in the late 1970s. 
To the limited extent that they were, their advantage has eroded rapidly 
in the years since 1978. Under pressure to reduce state expenditure, the 
Liberian Government has pursued a wage-restraint policy that bordered upon the 
draconian. In 1983, the Government cut money wages for public employees, and 
similar cuts followed in the private sector, including mining. This, along 
with inflation, has drastically eroded real wages. Food prices are estimated 
to have increased at about 10 per cent a year in Monrovia between 1980-83, and 
the money wage cut for unskilled government workers was 17 per cent. In 
addition, the Government at the same time raised indirect taxes (in response 
to IMF conditionality), which fall heaviest upon the poor in Liberia. 
Rising food prices have improved the short-run income position of farmers, but 
as in the case of Ghana supply seems to be quite price inelastic. Food 
imports have increased, rising to 20 per cent of a declining real import bill 
in the 1980s. 
Jamal: "Rural-urban gap and income distribution in Africa: 
Synthesis report of 17 countries" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 1984. 
These ratios are calculated from information in JASPA: "Rural-urban 
gap and income distribution: The case of Liberia" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 
1982, p. 66. 
For more on wage policy, see; A.A. Aboagye: "Impact of recession in 




Information on income trends is quite scarce for Liberia, so one must be 
cautious in drawing conclusions. It is unambiguously clear that real wages 
have fallen dramatically since the late 1970s. Employment, both in the public 
and private sectors (including mining), has also fallen. The rural-urban 
income gap has certainly narrowed (falling money wages and rising food 
prices), but by how much one can only speculate. In summary, evidence from 
Liberia confirms at least two of the identified general trends and contradicts 
none of them. 
Other countries 
Information on other African countries is limited, but what is available 
suggests similar conditions to those described above. Table 16 gives measures 
of the urban-rural income gap for six countries in the West African region. 
For all but the Cameroon, the gap is measured for both 1960 and 1980. It is 
to be noted that the ratios among the six are generally higher than for the 
countries so far considered. This is in part due to diffferences in method of 
measurement. 
For the five countries for which comparisons can be made over time, the 
gap fell substantially in three (Mali, Senegal and the Cote d'lvoire), but 
remained virtually the same in one (Burkina Faso) and rose in one (Togo) . In 
the case of Togo, evidence indicates that the gap has probably fallen in 
recent years, for the urban minimum wage dropped in real terms from 1978 to 
1983 by 33 per cent, and by 20 per cent from 1980 to 1983. If the 
urban-rural gap did not change, then a substantial redistribution from poor to 
rich in urban areas must have occurred. 
The country in West Africa with perhaps the largest gap between wage 
earners and peasants is the Cote d'lvoire, for data show that the ratio of the 
minimum wage to average agricultural incomes in 1978 was 2.9, by far the 
highest in the subregion. This ratio indicates an even larger gap between 
wage earners and poor peasants, for the Cote d'lvoire is the only country in 
West Africa in which the Gini coefficient for rural areas was greater than for 
urban areas (though by a small margin, 0.41 and 0.4). Evidence also 
indicates that unskilled wage earners have suffered the most in recent years. 
While total formal sector employment excluding the unskilled workers rose by 
K.M. Gozo: "Effets de la recession sur l'economie Togolaise" (Addis 
Ababa; BIT/PECTA, 1985). 
9 
BIT/PECTA: "Disparites de revenues entre les villes et les campagnes 
en C8te d'lvoire" (Addis Ababa, 1982). 
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Table 16: Urban-rural income gap in selected West African countries, 1960 and 
1980 
1960 1980 
Cameroon - 10.4 
Cote d'lvoire 10.7 7.3 
Mali 12.8 3.7 
Senegal 16.6 7.7 
Togo 3.3 5.8 
Burkina Faso 7.1 6.8 
Note: Average rural and urban incomes, measured at current prices and 
uncorrected for diferences in urban and rural prices. 
Source: Jamal; "Synthesis report of 17 African countries" (Addis Ababa, 
ILO/JASPA), 1984, p. 51. 
8 per cent from 1978 to 1981, employment for the unskilled fell by 19 per cent 
(table 17). Over the same period, the real value of the urban minimum wage 
fell by 16 per cent. In consequence, employment in the urban informal sector 
was estimated to have risen from about 250,000 to 330,000 from 1975 to 1980. 
It is reasonable to presume that the fall in unskilled employment and the 
increase in the informal sector ar"e not unrelated, and that the influx of 
unskilled workers into the informal sector drove down earnings there. There 
is some reason to believe that the decline in the formal sector may have 
stimulated the demand for informal sector products. However, this would be 
a very selective gain, benefiting those involved in productive activities. 
Entry into the informal sector is only superficially free. Taking up 
productive activities probably requires skills which unskilled wage earners 
are unlikely to possess. 
The tendency for the rural-urban gap to decline in these West African 
countries challenges the conventional wisdom on the causes of urban 
migration. According to available statistics, migration in all of these 
countries was quite substantial between 1960 and 1980, particularly in the 
Cote d'lvoire and Senegal where the gap fell sharply. These two tendencies 
cannot be reconciled by arguing that it was migration in response to the gap 
that brought about the narrowing. This argument would imply that urban 
migration should have declined over time along with the gap. Evidence 
1 Gozo and Aboagye, 1985, p. 111. 
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Table 17; Unskilled employment in the Cote d'lvoire, 1978-81 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
Unskilled (000's) 161 170 147 130 
Indices 
Unskilled 100 105 92 81 
Other 100 96 111 108 
Unskilled/Total 67 69 63 61 
Source; K.M. Gozo and A.A. Aboagye; "Impact of the recession in African 
countries: Synthesis report" (Addis Ababa, ILO/JASPA), 1985, p. 107. 
suggests that on the contrary migration was faster in the 1970s than in the 
1980s. 
Of the remaining countries of the subregion, most data are available for 
Zambia. ILO studies show that in both 1960 and 1980, the country had perhaps 
the highest urban-rural income gap on the continent. While it fell by 
almost two-thirds over the 20 years, the disparity was still enormous. This 
is, however, a case in which averages are completely misleading, for the 
enormous gap is largely the result of income inequality in urban areas. 
During colonial rule Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia) had many 
characteristics of a settler state, with tremendous income differentials on 
the basis of national origin. When nationals took over the posts of 
Europeans, salary scales were largely maintained without change, partly 
because many Europeans remained after independence, particularly in the 
mines. Table 18 shows the large intra-urban differences in incomes. The 
income differentials are based upon households in different types of 
dwellings, a distinction which corresponds to a quite strict segregation in 
urban areas based upon income status. Differentials declined slightly from 
1974 to 1976, but it is probably not valid to draw any conclusions from such a 
short period. Rather, an average of the two years should be taken as 
indicative of the situation in the mid-1970s. 
L ILO/JASPA; "Rural-urban gap: The case of Zambia", 1982. It should 
be noted that the figures given in the Zambia study are either an overestimate 
or based on a different methodology than those discussed in this section. See 
Jamal: "Synthesis report of 17 countries", 1984. For a discussion of 
distributional issues in Zambia see Rolph van der Hoeven: "Zambia1s income 
distribution during the early seventies" (Geneva, ILO), World Employment 
Programme Working Paper, 1977 and ILO/JASPA; Basic needs in an economy under 
pressure (Addis Ababa, 1981). 
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Table 18a Urban and rural incomes in Zambia, 1974 and 1975 
Population category Incomes Urban/rural 
1974 1976 1974 1976 
Urban 
Squatter 76 109 
Low-cost housing 97 144 
High-cost housing 478 581 
All urban 126 171 
Rural 39 60 
Source: ILO/JASPA; Zambia, 1982, p. 39. 
The table shows that the income differential between rural households and 
the urban poor (in squatter settlements and low-cost housing) was relatively 
low, similar to what was measured for other countries of the region. On the 
basis of other information about urban Zambia, it seems valid to presume that 
households in squatter settlements for the most part derived their incomes 
from the informal sector, while wage earners largely make up the population of 
low-cost housing. On these presumptions, informal sector households earned 
slightly less than twice the rural average, while the average for wage earner 
households was 2.5 times rural incomes. If one were to adjust for the 
diference in rural and urban prices (done for some of the previous countries 
considered), the peasant-wage earner gap would drop to about two. This 
differential is less than that measured for Kenya in 1976, but greater than 
for most West African countries and the United Republic of Tanzania. However, 
the gap is sufficient to make the incidence of poverty three times greater in 
rural areas than in urban ones. Since these figures were collected, the 
position of wage earners has probably deteriorated relatively to farmers, 
because the combination of rising oil prices and the world recession has had a 
severely depressing effect upon the mining sector, which dominates the formal 
2 
sector of the Zambian economy. 
1 See Jamal: "Synthesis report of 17 countries", p. 39. 
2 John Suckling: "The impact of energy price increases on an export-
dependent economy: Zambia, 1970-82";. World Employment Programme Research 











With regard to other countries, data show that the urban rural gap in the 
Congo is relatively small, comparable to that in West African countries, and 
apparently it did not change from 1960 to 1980 (3.6 and 3.5). A country 
whose recent experience seems to run counter to the trends we have identified 
is Zimbabwe. While this economy has also been negatively affected by oil 
2 
prices and the world recession, formal sector employment has remained 
stable and real wages have not fallen. Conditions in the countryside may have 
improved, for the country had particularly good harvests in 1984 and 1985, 
producing a surplus for export. However, rural-urban comparisons in Zimbabwe 
are complicated as in Kenya by the differences in large and small holdings, a 
legacy of colonialism and White minority rule. 
We conclude this discussion of the non-sampled countries by pointing out 
that all of the identified trends are confirmed or not contradicted by country 
evidence, with the exception of an apparently rising rural-urban gap in Togo. 
Even in this case there is reason to think that the gap has fallen since 1978. 
Summary of country evidence 
As we dealt with each country, we considered the trends identified in the 
second part of this report. Here the evidence from the various countries is 
summarised in tabular form, rather than repeating previous conclusions in the 
text. In table 19 the various countries are listed vertically and the trends 
summarised in the columns as follows: (1) the movement in average urban wages 
in real terms; (2) the security and stability of employment; (3) the 
standard of living and employment conditions of formal and informal sector 
workers; (4) the average urban-rural income gap; and (5) the overall 
distribution of income. 
Inspection of the table shows that in virtually all countries considered 
the trends identified were either confirmed or not contradicted. Because 
information on urban migration is not very precise, this trend is not included 
in the table. 
Jamal: "Synthesis report of 17 countries". 
Suckling: "Energy prices, development and the policy response in a 
small siege economy: Zimbabwe, 1964-81", World Employment Programme Research 
Working Paper, No. WEP 2-22/WP.119 (Geneva, ILO), May 1983. 
6874d/v.5 
- 49 -
Table 19; Summary of labour market trends in the African region (early 1970s 
to early 1980s) 








































































































a Average gap widened, wage earner/farmer ratio fell. 
For unskilled wage earners. 
c Because of migration, not relevant. See text. 




ASPECTS OF THEORY AND POLICY 
Virtually every country in Africa is suffering from an economic crisis, 
with the intensity varying from difficult to catastrophic. Were only a few 
countries facing problems, or even were it many, but with a handful displaying 
robust economic health, it might be credible to argue that the difficulties 
reflect unwise and misguided government policies. But when a crisis situation 
is universal, suffered by governments of the right and the left, by 
governments fundamentally committed to letting market forces run free and 
others that seek to limit and restrict market transactions, policies pursued 
by particular countries can explain little. It is for this reason that the 
IMF's uniform approach, with all emphasis upon domestic adjustment, is being 
received with decreasing credibility, even by economic conservatives. The 
current depression of economic activity in the African region is not basically 
a problem of individual countries. Evidence for this assertion is 
overwhelming. 
Notwithstanding this, many African governments are in desperate need of 
foreign exchange to cover trade deficits and have little choice but to accept 
the conditionalities demanded by the IMF. Among the items of conditionality 
is almost invariably devaluation (though Liberia, which uses the US dollar is 
presumably an exception). It is rather strange that devaluation should play 
such an important role in adjustment programmes, since its effectiveness as a 
policy instrument has been largely discredited by the new wave of conservative 
monetarists. And a wealth of economic theory anti-dating the public policy 
nihilism of "rational expectations" and the monetarist theory of the balance 
of payments casts doubt upon the impact of devaluation. 
Devaluation is recommended on the grounds that one of its effects will be 
to shift relative profitability toward export production. Even were this 
true, advocating such a policy to a large number of countries (Asian and Latin 
American countries are prescribed the same remedy with the same enthusiasm) is 
precisely the "beggar thy neighbour" strategy which economists have generally 
condemned as contributing to the breakdown of world trade during the Great 
Depression. Fishlow has argued forcefully that such an export-promotion 
strategy is implicitly based upon a ceteris paribus presumption that only the 
1 See the position of the Thatcher Government described by Richard 




country in question will execute it. If all cocoa producers, for example, 
were to devalue, it is optimistic to think that the net increase in world 
demand for cocoa would sustain the presumed supply response from 
cocoa-producing countries. 
And the theoretical outcome of devaluation is indeterminant, as shown in 
2 
an ILO paper surveying the state of the theory. Recent empirical work for 
the Sudan, using an econometric simulation model, verifies this theoretical 
3 
argument in a concrete case study. If devaluation has little to recommend 
it on either theoretical or empirical grounds, how does one account for its 
robust presence in IMF structural adjustment programmes? In part, the answer 
is a purely ideological one. Economic conservatives hold devaluation as a 
central tenet of the dogma that unregulated markets are self-adjusting and 
equilibrating, just as they never accepted Keynes's argument that falling 
wages will not clear labour markets in the aggregate (an issue considered 
below). 
To be more charitable, there is a second consideration at work here. On 
three continents the economies of less developed countries are in crisis, even 
those hailed by conservatives as great success stories a decade ago. In 
present circumstances, with world liquidity tight and the OECD countries 
unlikely to exhibit more than modest expansion in the aggregate, the prospects 
for even a few less developed countries recovering in an impressive manner is 
slight. In such circumstances, it is hard for one to know what governments 
should do. Indeed, with regard to generating growth and a manageable external 
A. Fishlow: "The state of Latin American economics", in 
Inter-American Development Bank, Economic and Social Progress in Latin 
America, Report 1985 (Washington, IDB), 1985. If all countries followed the 
World Bank's advice as given in Accelerated development in sub-Saharan 
Africa: An Agenda- for Action (Washington DC, World Bank, T98T1 prices would 
fall. The response of the Bank (by Elliot Berg, the principal author of 
Agenda) is precisely beggar thy neighbour - or perish: "First of all, not all 
countries will follow counsel to expand primary exports. So those that do 
will capture the markets of those that do not, regardless of their respective 
comparative advantages. Given this reality, those who stand on the sidelines 
and urge African States to shun the export sector are in fact handing over 
market shares to Brazil or Malaysia or Indonesia." Elliot Berg: "The World 
Bank's strategy" in J. Ravenhill (ed.): Africa in economic crisis 
(Houndmills, Macmillan), 1986. 
2 E. Ghani; "The effects of devaluation on employment and poverty in 
developing countries", World Employment Programme Research Working Paper No. 
WEP 2-32/WP.57 (Geneva, ILO), Nov. 1984, pp. 7-12. 
3 N. Nureldin and A.P. Thirlwall: "The IMF supply-side approach to 
devaluation: An assessment with reference to the Sudan", in Bulletin (Oxford 
Institute of Economics and Statistics), May 1984, Vol. 46, No. 2. 
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account, there may be nothing they can do to alter the situation 
dramatically. Such a defeatist view, though it may be true, contradicts the 
tradition of eternal optimism which has been part of Western thought since the 
age of reason. Devaluation enters here in a ceremonial, almost religious 
role, supplying a source of optimism in face of a disastrous reality. 
Specifically in the African context, we have seen that economic 
stagnation and decline have brought about many of the changes which 
devaluation is pledged to achieve. In virtually every country real wages have 
fallen, presumably more than enough to reduce labour costs substantially. 
Food prices have risen dramatically and relatively to the general price level, 
which should by neoclassical analysis stimulate production. In the event 
neither of these trends seems to have improved matters. To a Keynesian, this 
is hardly surprising, for in the General Theory it is argued that falling 
wages herald economic decline, not recovery. The trend in the terms of trade 
of export crops relatively to the general price level is mixed in the African 
region, but the export performance of countries in which exporters' terms of 
trade have improved seems no better than in countries where this has not 
happened. There are clearly other forces at work which render changes in the 
terms of trade alone of marginal significance. 
It appears that in present circumstances, devaluation in most African 
- countries would worsen income distribution while having little impact on 
production. This has not always been the case, for in the past rural-urban 
income differentials were quite large in many countries. But since the 
mid-1970s at least, urban dwellers (except the elite) have lost almost 
continuously compared to those living in rural areas. Devaluation would 
intensify this trend. If one can extrapolate from the evidence in this 
report, the likely effect of devaluation in many countries of the region would 
be to redistribute income from workers, peasants, and informal sector 
operators to the wealthy, urban and rural. 
Be that as it may, those who argue for devaluation as a vehicle to 
"correct distortions" have a trump card. While real wages may have fallen and 
the urban-rural gap may have declined, does it not remain the case that urban 
labour markets in Africa are characterised by excess supply? And if the 
answer to this is "yes", then real wages need to fall more, for their 
prevailing level is above the "market-clearing" rate. One implication of this 
argument is that while it is perhaps unfortunate that real wages have fallen 
65 per cent in a short period in the United Republic of Tanzania, such a 
judgement is subjective. On objective (optimal allocation) grounds, wages 
remain too high. 
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This argument that an excess supply of labour services (or any commodity) 
implies that its price is too high was discredited even a decade ago, for it 
is based upon a Walrasian general equilibrium model in which no exchanges 
occur at disequilibrium prices and (therefore) all adjustment is 
instantaneous. Its rejuvenated appeal today reflects not an adequate 
rejoinder to its past critics, but a change in the general political climate 
in the West that makes such conservative arguments more acceptable, their 
theoretical shortcomings notwithstanding. One need not go into these esoteric 
debates to demonstrate the invalidity of this argument for African labour 
markets. 
In African urban areas, unemployment by the definition used in industrial 
capitalist countries hardly exists (with the exception of South Africa). 
Excess labour supply does not take this form. Those who cannot find formal 
sector jobs engage themselves in informal activities, including casual 
labour. This relationship has characteristically been considered on the 
implicit assumption that wage incomes are higher than rural incomes and higher 
than can be earned in informal activities. But let us consider for the moment 
the interaction of different labour markets without reference to relative 
rewards. When wage incomes decline in real terms, households of wage earners 
can be presumed to seek ways of supplementing their purchasing power. One way 
to do this is for family members - and perhaps the wage earners themselves -
to work in the informal sector. As real wages fall further, this tendency 
2 
will intensify. Even if wages drop very low in real terms, it would be 
irrational for those employed to give up their formal sector jobs, unless 
informal sector earnings per worker rose sufficiently to compensate for the 
decline in wages (not merely above the level of wages). 
If incomes in the informal sector are in part a function of formal sector 
performance, then the fall in real wages will drive down the incomes in the 
informal sector. Thus, the dynamics of the labour market wil be for wage 
earners to hold onto their formal sector jobs as part of their strategy for 
protecting household purchasing power. And informal sector operators will 
still be attracted to formal sector jobs because of depressed informal sector 
earnings (even if' those earnings rise above the wage level). In this context, 
1 The critical literature on this issue is vast. The seminal works are 
R. Clower; "The Keynesian counter-revolution: A theoretical appraisal", in 
F.H. Hahn and F.P.R. Brechling (eds.): The theory of interest rates (New 
York), St. Martin's Press, 1965; and A. Leijonhufvud: "Keynesian economics 
and the economics of Keynes" (Oxford University Press), 1968. 
Jamal; Uganda for an extreme and speeded-up case of this. 
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a drop in real wages is likely to increase the demand for both formal sector 
and informal sector employment. Even should the formal sector wage drop below 
the level of earnings in the informal sector, the result need not be a 
shortage of labour in the formal sector. Households seek to protect their 
standard of living, not make exclusive choices between the returns from 
different activities as a capitalist does when investing. 
The problem with the usual labour market model is that it mis-specifies 
the supply curve. Here we are not considering the trivial case of the 
"backward-bending" labour supply curve, but rather how a household responds to 
a fall in real income. The neoclassical approach presumes that an exclusive 
choice will be made among income-earning alternatives irrespective of the 
level at which the choice must be made. This involves a false analogy with 
the choices made by a capitalist. The capitalist chooses among alternatives 
based on their rate of return (or discounted present value), but the absolute 
income gained from these can always be expanded by merely investing more. The 
situation of the non-capitalist is entirely different. A wage earner cannot 
by his or her own action expand the time worked on the job. Nor can he or she 
usually take a second job of the same type because of the institutional way in 
which working time is divided. The consequence of this interaction of labour 
markets is that falling wages need have no tendency to "clear" markets. On 
the contrary, an excess supply of labour can signal either that wage levels 
are "too high" (attracting the envy of workers outside the formal sector) or 
"too low" (attracting labour because the general level of incomes is low). 
Thus the general equilibrium model of labour markets with its implicit 
symmetry between the labour and capital markets may prove misleading for 
understanding the dynamics of rural-urban interactions in Africa. 
1 The argument made here has some aspects in common with Clower's "dual 
decision hypothesis", which models the behaviour of economic agents when their 

























































































































* Ratio of the number of countries with rising per capita income to total 
countries with data for that year. 
Sources: United Nations: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, July 1985; and 
national publications for Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
Appendix table 2; Indices of enumerated wage employment in selected African 
countries, 1978-83 



































































































Appendix table 3: Indices of wage employment in construction for selected 
African countries, 1978-83 






































Appendix table 4; Price-deflated non-agricultural average 
selected African countries, 1978-83 
earnings for 


































































Appendix table 5: Price-deflated average earnings in construction for 
selected African countries, 1978-83 
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